

ISF INTERIM EVALUATION REPORT



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INDEPENDENT EXPERTS (AS REQUIRED IN ART. 56(3) OF THE REGULATION (EU) NO 514/2014)

The evaluations are carried out by experts who are functionally independent of the Responsible Authorities, the Audit Authorities and the Delegated Authorities. The Responsible Authority entrusted the evaluations to external experts. The evaluation contractor is a private company KPMG Oy Ab.

Finnish government's central purchasing body Hansel had a framework agreement for these kinds of services. Under this framework agreement it was possible to organize a simplified procurement. The call for tenders was open in March, but there were no offers submitted. We negotiated directly with one of the framework contractors and asked their offer to make direct award of the contract.

The evaluators have adequate expertise because they prepared also the SOLID final evaluations.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The ISF programme covers the programme phase 2014-2020 and is divided into five Specific Objectives (SO): Visa Policy, Borders, Operational Support, Crime, and Risks & Crises. Altogether 62 projects have been chosen and 25 have been finalised at the time of this evaluation.

This evaluation had a primary focus in the alignment of the funded project portfolio compared to the targets set by the European Commission. The purpose was to make sure that the ISF fund is progressing in the right direction. At the time of the evaluation only about 41 % of the projects had been completed. The results indicated that the value of this evaluation would be in the alignment of activities rather than in measuring outcomes against set targets. Nevertheless, the indicators of the program were also evaluated to provide understanding of the current progress towards targets.

The data used for this evaluation has been collected by combining qualitative and quantitative data collection methods from reporting, interviews of personnel of the Ministry of the Interior of Finland, other relevant government officials and beneficiaries. The data was analysed and the actual evaluation of the results and possible impacts were conducted by triangulating the information provided by the project implementers, government officials, and official government reports.

During the implementation of the ISF program there has been a significant change in the operational environment covered by the Fund as compared to the situation in 2013. The changes were mainly related to in the political and economic environment in Russia, increased threat of terrorism and the fast and extensive increase in asylum seekers in 2015. The number of asylum applications was ten times higher than average in Finland. All these changes made the ISF actions more relevant than ever. The changes in the operational environment mainly affected in the emphasis of the objectives, especially the special objective of Risks and Crises. However this change also brought out the importance of flexible reaction to changes in the funding. Based on the evaluation, the objectives of the interventions funded by the Fund corresponded to the actual needs of the Member State.

Within the Specific Objective SO 1 **Visa Policy**, a total of 7 projects were funded. The cumulative budget of the projects is 5,01 million euro with an EU funding share of 3,75 million. The SO 1 objective promoting common Schengen visa policy includes the legal entry and the prevention of illegal immigration. The focus of Finnish visa policy is to cooperate with third countries and in the national visa information system SUVI. Main actions are related to introducing Schengen Visa Information System (VIS) including VISMAIL mechanism (VMCM) and fingerprint matching. This is expected to facilitate legitimate travel by promoting fast, reliable and location independent information transfer and exchange. Services for visa applicants in third countries were also improved and common visa policy was supported. All actions also helped with tackling illegal immigration.

Within SO 2 **Borders**, a total of 18 projects have been funded. The cumulative budget of the projects is 3,53 million euro with a EU funding share of 2,71 million. SO 2 covers the safeguarding of the capacity of border control authorities and the preparation for a possible increase in the cross-border traffic while maintaining credible border surveillance capabilities. These are even more relevant objectives in the changed operational

environment. Several actions were executed to develop and ensure the credibility of the border surveillance, to improve border management as well as to promote information exchange.

Within SO 3 **Operational Support**, a total of 4 projects have been funded. The cumulative budget of the projects is 6,99 million euro with an EU funding share of 6,99 million. SO 3 is granted for the maintenance costs of some information systems, the wage costs of the staff of the national EUROSUR Coordination Centre and the maintenance and maintenance costs of vessels and other means of transport. Operational support was seen as a welcomed addition to the program, beneficiaries were able to fund ongoing activities and to place operational focus on these. Changes in the operational environment in terms of illegal immigration impose new performance and preparedness requirements on the surveillance at external borders.

Within SO 5 **Crime**, a total of 26 projects have been funded. The cumulative budget of the projects is 13, 79 million euro with an EU funding share of 10,34 million. SO 5 focuses on combating organised crime, terrorism, violent extremism and radicalisation, cybercrime and economic crime. The increased threat of terrorism, in both Europe and Finland, signify that the SO 5 is extremely relevant. SO 5 contributed to enhancing effectiveness of investigative actions, reducing cost and increasing the risk of getting caught of crime.

Within SO 6 **Risks and Crises**, a total of 7 projects have been funded. The cumulative budget of the projects is 2, 16 million euro with an EU funding share of 1,62 million. SO 6 includes the protection of persons and infrastructure against various threats and the preparedness of various authorities. Digitalization and the development of IT have caused changes in the operational environment. New technology brings threats such as hybrid warfare and cybercrime, and the priorities of CBRNE (Chemical, Radiological, Biological, Nuclear, and Explosive) is increased with regard to handling substances that may have links to terrorism. SO 6 enables the recognition of substances and makes protection efforts more efficient.

Based on the observations made during the evaluation, the general objectives of the Fund were reached at a fairly reasonable cost. The implementation of the program was started effectively by the Responsible Authority (RA) after the delayed approval of the National Programme (NP). The objectives set in the NP are mainly coherent with the ones set in other programs funded by EU resources and applying to similar areas of work. There are no large discrepancies in this issue.

The main type of added value resulting from the support of the Fund deals with the ability to start actions earlier, their volume and scope. The Fund has enabled to do continuous development work and further forms of actions.

The main beneficiaries of ISF are authorities which itself highlight the importance of actions being carried out in an effective and lasting way. Sustainability is assessed by the RA both in the programming and the implementation stages. Based on our observation, several great benefits have been gained from the actions and they are expected to be continued in the future. However some further analysis from the beneficiaries' side could be expected.

Simplification and reduction of the administrative burden of the beneficiaries has not yet been substantially realized. The change to multiannual program and operating support were welcomed reforms. The procedures, reporting and the electronic system still need further

development.

The main conclusion and recommendations are:

1. The **electronic system** for application and reporting had several parts which beneficiaries found inconvenient and time-consuming. It was also pointed out that the reporting sheet did not support ongoing actions of operating support. Thus we recommend to further develop the system and the reporting sheets.
2. In order to ensure that the projects deliver outputs that are aligned with the targets of the fund, the final indicators should be available at the beginning of programming phase. It is recommended, that in the following program period, the EU Commission give a **clear list of indicators** to be collected so that both the national RA and the beneficiaries can better adjust to indicators.
3. It was noted that the RA has not utilized a log frame approach as part of the planning process for the National Programme. We recommend that **a log frame** approach be used in aligning the project activities and indicators. Using a log frame during the planning phase creates clarity on the impact path between individual activities and long term impacts that the fund aims to have an impact on.
4. **Assessment of sustainability in the final reporting.** The current completion reporting template for beneficiaries does not include a section on where the beneficiary could assess how well the activities of the project has succeeded from the point of view of sustainability. This section could also include planned steps for example for a six month period on how the sustainability of the results could be strengthened after the project has been completed.
5. **Operating support** in ISF-B was a welcome reform and this additional funding made possible to apply funding for operational cost. This supports maintaining and securing the existing important systems as well as promoting the usage of uniform EU practices and systems. We recommend to consider whether this can be expanded also to the ISF-P.

SECTION I: CONTEXT OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ISF DURING 01/01/2014 - 30/06/2017

The operating environment was changed dramatically in 2015, as Finland faced a fast and extensive increase in the number of asylum seekers. There have also been changes in the political and economic environment in Russia, and the security situation has become more difficult to predict. Responding to new security problems and cross-border challenges requires increased international cooperation and EU-level coordination.

In Finland, the border surveillance is increasingly based on technical surveillance as human resources are reduced. In order to maintain the current level of border security, the equipment needs renewal and updating. The abolition of internal border controls cannot come at the expense of security and thus goes hand in hand with the objective of improving security through more efficient external border controls.

The focus of the Finnish visa policy is in the cooperation with third countries and in the national visa information system SUVI. The number of visa applications has increased in the long term. Due to the economic and political situation, traffic from Russia has not increased as much as expected, but Russia stays in the focus in the long term. The visa applications from some other third countries have increased substantially.

Illegal entries have slightly increased and thus the LOI network plays an important role in this. The risks for illegal immigration is also higher in a situation of large scale immigration. Illegal immigration poses challenges for internal security, and requires more police action and border control measures.

Large-scale immigration has brought several challenges that are new to the operating environment. A customer group that is keeping the authorities increasingly busy is individuals whose asylum applications have been rejected but who still remain in the country. Illegal residents are also more prone to the risk of human trafficking, and therefore actions in this area have also needed to be established, especially in order to identify possible victims.

In addition to the before mentioned, digitalisation also poses new threats in the operational environment. Hybrid warfare and cybercrime are on the rise, and require new IT systems and training. The need for new equipment for CBRNE related issues has also been identified, in order to handle and identify new substances that may have a link to terrorism.

SECTION II: CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL PROGRAMME

Based on the evaluation, there were three challenges that had an effect on the whole fund and how the NP was implemented during 1.1.2014-30.6.2017. Firstly, the delay of the NP approval from the European Commission (EC) delayed the opening of calls for funding proposals until August 2015. Based on our estimate, this created a delay of at least 12 months in the implementation of the operations of the fund even though implementation of the program was started effectively by RA. Due to this, the first funding contracts were made in January 2016. This also had an impact on this Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) by the fact that 25 projects out of 61 had been completed by 30.6.2017. The program was adopted in 2015 and the first projects started in the beginning of 2016.

Secondly, there is a challenge that is mostly related to evaluation and indicators prepared for the Fund. It has been, at least to some extent, unclear until autumn 2017, which are the final indicators of the fund. In order to ensure that the projects deliver outputs that are aligned with the targets of the fund, the indicators should be confirmed at an EU level before the implementation of the Fund. Also, the indicators have been uncertain and based on the Annual Implementation Report (AIR) of 2016.

Thirdly, there were challenges reported in interviews by the project beneficiaries, concerning operational difficulties and bureaucracy.

SECTION III: DEVIATIONS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL PROGRAMMES IN COMPARISON WITH WHAT WAS INITIALLY PLANNED (IF ANY)

The operational environment has changed radically from when the program was initially planned. One of the biggest changes in the operating environment across the whole of Europe was the rapid and widespread increase in the number of asylum seekers in 2015. In relation to its population Finland received the fourth highest number of asylum seekers of all EU countries in 2015. Large-scale immigration has brought several challenges that are new to the operating environment.

Large-scale immigration has brought several challenges that are new to the operating environment. Large-scale immigration has posed challenges to the internal security. A customer group that is keeping the authorities increasingly busy is individuals whose asylum applications have been rejected but who still remain in the country. For example, it is important to provide support for the asylum seekers whose applications are rejected as difficult situations can make them more vulnerable to mental health issues or encourage radical thinking. Illegal residents are also more prone to the risk of human trafficking, and therefore actions in this area have also needed to be established, especially in order to identify possible victims. The number of victims of human trafficking in the books of the official assistance system currently stands at 269 while it was only 90 in 2014-2015.

There have been also changes in the security environment. Russian foreign policy and the country's economic troubles make the situation on the eastern border of Finland somewhat less predictable. National threat and terrorism aspects became apparent a little later on. The Finnish Security Intelligence Service raised its terrorism threat level to "elevated" on 14 June 2017 followed by a terrorist intent in Turku the following month, where two people were killed and eight attempted murders were committed. The risks for illegal immigrations is also higher in a situation with large scale immigration. Illegal immigration poses challenges for internal security, and requires more police action and border control measures.

The planned exemption from visa between Russia and EU did not take place but it does not affect actual actions of the development needs of the visa system and the preparation for an increase in cross-border traffic.

Digitalization and the rapid development of information technology are also causing changes in the operational environment. New technology brings not only opportunities but also new threats such as hybrid warfare and cybercrime. The legislation change on tele operational inquiries (intelligence law) are also an upcoming substantial investment that requires funding.

All of these changes in circumstances mean that the implementation of the program is more important than ever, but also that certain parts of the program need to be updated, mainly concerning the emphasizes. It is typical for the current operating environment that changes are fast and unpredictable. Therefore there is a need for flexible reaction to changes in funding.

It is difficult to assess how great the changes in the operational environment are since there is no clear overall picture of the changed situation and the measures this may actually

require. There is also an element of uncertainty in the global political environment.

SECTION IV: EVALUATION QUESTIONS

1	Effectiveness
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1.1	Specific objective 1: Visa policy / ISF-B Article 3(2)(a)
	<p>The overall question: How did the Fund contribute to the achievement of the following specific objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support a common visa policy to facilitate legitimate travel; - Provide a high quality of service to visa applicants; - Ensure equal treatment of third-country nationals and - Tackle illegal migration?
	<p>According to Finland’s National Programme (NP) of the ISF Fund, the national targets under the Specific Objective 1 (SO1) are focused on a common visa policy to facilitate legitimate travel and on tackling illegal migration. A total of 7 projects worth 3 757 987, 50 EUR of EU funding have been financed so far under this SO. The beneficiaries were the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Border Guard and the Customs.</p> <p>The development project of Finland’s national visa information system (SUVI), which is linked to the CVIS, will contribute to the NP particularly by streamlining the visa handling process, supporting common visa policy to facilitate legitimate travel and helping to tackle illegal immigration. The system will be subject to technical changes that will develop the functionalities required by the Visa Code Plus and improve its ability to communicate with the CVIS and the external service providers systems.</p> <p>The development of the visa application process and the establishment of outsourced visa service centres for visa application submitting are particularly improving the services for the visa applicants. It is also expected to boost the efficiency of operations and to contribute to the equal treatment of third-country nationals. This also has a link to the SUVI project.</p> <p>The project by the Customs will contribute to the NP by equipping border crossing points with mobile devices for granting visas. In the project, implemented by the Border Guard, fingerprint scanners will be acquired in order to conduct the fingerprint comparisons required by the VIS. Both of these projects support the common visa policy to facilitate legitimate travel and to provide high quality service.</p> <p>The liaison officer network was improved by appointing one liaison officer to Abuja, Nigeria and one to New Delhi India. The liaison officer network has proved to be an excellent tool to combat proactively illegal entry and other cross-border crime. Also the regional training organised by Consular Services of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and by the ISF are expected to not only to contribute to providing high quality services to visa applicants and ensuring equal treatment</p>

	of third-country nationals but also to helping tackle illegal migration.
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1.1.1	What progress was made towards promoting the development and implementation of the common visa policy to facilitate legitimate travel, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?
	<p>One of Finland’s targets according to the National Programme of the ISF is to support legitimate travel. The focus has been on acquiring relevant devices, developing the visa system and the visa granting process as well cooperating with other consulates. A total of 3 projects are particularly promoting the development and implementation of the common visa policy to facilitate legitimate travel.</p> <p>The development of visa systems is focused on the national visa system SUVI. The main actions of the project are related to the VISMAIL mechanism (VMCM) and fingerprint matching. The VIS enables border guards to verify that a person presenting a visa is its rightful holder and to identify persons found on the Schengen territory with no or fraudulent documents. This is expected to facilitate legitimate travel by promoting fast, reliable and location independent information transfer and exchange. The SUVI project is described more in detail in paragraph 1.1.5</p> <p>Finland has a long coast and several unstaffed harbors, and the number of border crossing points has been increased due to structural changes. New technology is needed to assure smooth legitimate travel. Mobile devices for granting visas will be acquired by the Customs. This is a good example of how smooth travel can be contributed to by location independent devices. These devices allow granting visas for sailors also at unattended borders, which saves remarkably the time of an applicant and an officer by removing the need to transport applicants to other localities. The devices are compatible with the VIS-system. According to the latest project status report the devices were planned to be acquired during May 2017.</p> <p>Using biometric data to confirm a visa holder's identity allows for faster, more accurate and more secure checks. Fingerprint scanners (with wire) were acquired by the Board Guard. The original plan was to acquire such scanners. The acquirement of wireless fingerprint scanners is still on hold due their strong dependence on the RATAS-program which has been delayed. Wireless fingerprint scanners and their integration to the background system allows to carry out border check also at the traffic lane. This facilitates legitimate travel as it expedites the processing times at border checks. For example on the south-eastern border the queuing times would be unreasonable during the increased border control together with the new visas with biometrics but without these scanners.</p>

1.1.2	What progress was made towards ensuring better consular coverage and harmonised practices on visa issuance between Member States, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?
	<p>A total of two projects are particularly supporting progress for ensuring better consular coverage and harmonized practices on visa issuance between the Member States. The focus is on improving the Liaison officer network and establishing visa service centres.</p> <p>The liaison officer network was improved by appointing one liaison officer to Abuja, Nigeria and one to New Delhi India. These officers take part in the visa granting process and can also support other EU-missions. The network not only improves consular service coverage and strengthens the Member State's and EU presence in those locations, but also supports the harmonized visa issuance practice by providing technical or subject matter expertise. This project is described more in detail in paragraph 1.1.4</p> <p>Finland has good experience in visa service centre outsourcing. Finland has improved consular coverage by establishing a total of 29 outsourced visa service centres. The target was 19 visa service centres. The number includes both hub and satellite service centres. Service centres are located in Thailand (1), China (15), India (6), Turkey (2), Egypt (1), Tunis (1) and Great Britain (3). The hub service centres are located in missions. The visa service centres are serving visa applicants by submitting the applications. The service centers have 4V-functionalities which allow transferring biometric identifiers from the service centers to the national visa system (SUVI). ISF funding was found important for responding to the challenge of growing numbers of visa applications in these locations. It can be said that the visa service centres have a remarkable role in the sense that the financial resources are limited and not expected to grow, and at the same time the demand for the visa services in certain locations has increased. The concept is clever as it is self-financing and the operations do not produce any costs to the Member State after establishing the centres. The project also included training and the outsourcing partner works in cooperation with the other entry services of the mission in question. The aim of the project was to receive 100% cost correlation, which according to the final report, has been received, and in certain location even exceed. Also the quality of applications has been improved. All service centres have same harmonized practices.</p>

1.1.3	What progress was made towards ensuring the application of the Union's acquis on visas and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?
	<p>There are two projects funded under the ISF Fund that are particularly supporting progress towards ensuring the application of the Union's acquis on visas. The focus is on the development of the IT-system to conform the EU requirements and regional trainings.</p> <p>The Finnish national visa system SUVI is integrated with the VIS-system which</p>

	<p>is the common visa system of the Schengen countries. Fingerprints are required by the VIS. One of the projects develops the outsourcing of the visa application process to improve services for visa applicants and to boost the efficiency of operations. The new service centres have 4V-functionalities which allow transferring biometric identifiers from the service centres to the national visa system (SUVI). The project was described more in detail in paragraph 1.2.2</p> <p>Regional trainings were organised by the Consular Services of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under one of the projects. This training is found to improve the knowhow on preventing human trafficking and illegal immigration, applying EU protocol, deployment of biometrics and the cooperation between authorities. Trainings were organised for the personnel of consular services in St. Petersburg, Washington and Addis Ababa. The duration of each training was 1 week. The target was to train 120 persons. This target was not entirely achieved as according to the final report 80 persons took part in these trainings. However, this can still be considered a good result. The main achievements, according to the final report, were better knowhow and networking.</p>
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1.1.4	<p>What progress was made towards Member States' contribution to strengthening the cooperation between Member States operating in third countries as regards the flows of third-country nationals into the territory of Member States, including prevention and tackling of illegal immigration, as well as the cooperation with third countries, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?</p>
	<p>There are four projects funded under ISF Fund which are particularly supporting progress towards Member States' contribution to strengthening the cooperation between Member States operating in third countries, as regards the flow of third-country nationals into the territory of Member States, including prevention and tackling illegal immigration, as well as the cooperation with third countries.</p> <p>Developing Finland's national visa information system (SUVI) which includes important functionalities for consular cooperation (see 1.5.5). Outsourced services centres are working in cooperation with other mission's entry services (see 1.2.2). Regional trainings improve competence of the personnel, which helps to prevent illegal migration (see 1.2.3).</p> <p>The liaison officer network project is supporting progress towards Member States' contribution to strengthening the cooperation between Member States operating in third countries by appointing one liaison officer to Abuja, Nigeria and one to New Delhi India. The ILOs supported the progress by investigating the backgrounds of visa applicants and by examining the authenticity of documents. Furthermore, the ILOs supported other EU-embassies and trained embassy personnel. The aim of the ILO network is to increase EU solidarity by creating and maintaining networks of cooperation, decreasing the risk of illegal immigration, preventing human trafficking and terrorism and increasing national security. These officers take part in the visa granting process and can also support the actions of other EU-missions. At the centre stage in their tasks during this project has been document advisory and cooperation between the missions.</p>

	<p>This has improved document security and document investigation with technical tools by employees of airline companies and missions. These trainings also included the profiling and identification of impostors. Part of the liaison officer work has been also to interview applicants when there is need, for example in case of a bad profile.</p>
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1.1.5	<p>What progress was made towards supporting the common visa policy by setting up and running IT systems, their communication infrastructure and equipment, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?</p>
	<p>The Ministry for Foreign Affairs' project will contribute to the National Program by developing Finland's national visa information system (SUVI), which is linked to the CVIS (Central visa information system). The VIS processes data and decisions relating to applications for short-stay visas to visit, or to transit through, the Schengen Area. The system can perform biometric matching, primarily of fingerprints, for identification and verification purposes.</p> <p>The SUVI system will be subject to technical changes that will develop the functionalities required by the Visa Code Plus and improve its ability to communicate with the CVIS and the systems of external services providers. These new functionalities which support the EU Schengen requirements are expected to streamline the usability of the national visa information system as well as consular cooperation by harmonizing consular tasks and promoting information sharing. The project did not manage to implement all functionalities in the set timetable and thus a new project was set to finalize these. This project is expected to be ready by 30.3.2018.</p>

1.1.6	<p>How did the operating support provided for in Article 10 of the Regulation (EU) No 515/2014 contribute to the achievement of the specific objective on common visa policy?</p>
	<p>According to the evaluation, there is one project that contributes to the specific objective on common visa policy. The project has received EU funding of 1270 547 EUR.</p> <p>The aim was to maintain and secure the existing national visa system and joint actions in the VIS-central system. VIS is the common central visa system for Schengen countries and was brought into use in 2011. The SUVI visa system consists of two parts. 1) National part (SUVI in Finland) with which the Member States handle visa applications within their national authorities. From this system the predetermined information is transferred to the Member States' common visa system (C-VIS). 2), the member state common visa register (VIS) which handles the information transfers of individual visa applicants between Member States. The system is now functional and in agreement with contracts, regulations and</p>

	legislation. The system has secured high usability on 24/7 and 365 days a year, and risk minimization has been possible due to the high availability of technical solutions.
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1.2	Specific objective 2: Borders / ISF-B Article 3(2)(b)
	<p>The overall question: How did the Fund contribute to the following specific objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Supporting integrated border management, including promoting further harmonisation of border management-related measures in accordance with common Union standards and through the sharing of information between Member States and between Member States and the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union? - Ensuring, on one hand, a uniform and high level of control and protection of the external borders, including by the tackling of illegal immigration and, on the other hand, the smooth crossing of the external borders in conformity with the Schengen acquis, while guaranteeing access to international protection for those needing it, in accordance with the obligations contracted by the Member States in the field of human rights, including the principle of non-refoulement?
	<p>A total of 18 projects worth 7 361 326, 87 EUR of EU funding have been financed so far under the SO2. The main beneficiary was the Border Guard. One project was implemented by the National Police Board.</p> <p>Several projects were financed to ensure a uniform and high level of control and protection of the external borders. There are several projects which are related to the renewal and updating of surveillance equipment and technology by upgrading vessel surveillance systems. The key actions are modernizing patrol equipment, renewing patrol vehicles, developing the technical surveillance of the sea border and land border, creating the capacity of service vessels' camera sensors and improving helicopter surveillance capabilities and acquiring a light E-boat. There are 3 projects which are focused on improving the situation picture by preparing and providing upgraded premises for the NCC, via the production and development of a border surveillance and situational picture applications and by developing the situational picture systems by improving the live video streaming of mobile units.</p> <p>There are 2 projects which focused on the common requirements of the EU. One of them was the development of the environment for managing travel document certificates of cross-border passengers. This is supporting integrated border management, including promoting further harmonization of border management-related measures in accordance with common Union standards and through the sharing of information between the MS. This contributes also to the tackling of illegal immigration. The second project focusing on common EU requirements was modifying a border training vessel to meet current requirements.</p> <p>There are several projects which contribute to the smooth crossing of external borders in conformity with the Schengen acquis: the MOBILE-RATAS which is</p>

	<p>a mobile application for carrying out border checks, the Liaison officer system project which also has an important role on tackling illegal immigration, acquiring document readers for portable border control devices and the development of Russian language training. Information sharing has an essential role in most of the projects. Respecting basic human rights are mentioned in a special objective of the NP and it is expected to be taken into account in all the funded projects.</p>
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1.2.1	<p>What progress was made towards promoting the development, implementation and enforcement of policies with a view to ensure the absence of any controls on persons when crossing the internal borders, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?</p>
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	<p>The abolition of internal border controls cannot come at the expense of security and thus this objective goes hand in hand with the objective of improving security through more efficient external border controls and border surveillance. All actions aiming at maintaining credible border surveillance capabilities and improving the situational picture are promoting the development, implementation and enforcement of policies with a view to ensuring the absence of any controls on persons when crossing the internal borders. When external borders are secured, the internal borders can be open.</p> <p>Also the harmonising of rules and procedures as well information sharing has an important role here. The EU has established an information sharing and cooperation mechanism called EUROSUR (European Border Surveillance System). This mechanism provides Schengen countries with a common operational and technical framework, which assists them in encountering cross-border crime, preventing unauthorized border crossings and diminishing the tragic death tolls of migrants at sea. For example projects improving the situational picture (see 1.2.5) are also contributing to the EUROSUR.</p> <p>There are several projects which are related to the renewal and updating of surveillance equipment and technology by upgrading vessel surveillance systems.</p> <p>Modernizing patrol equipment (optronic devices). Optronic devices for patrol use were acquired. The project was not accomplished in the set schedule as the bidding process and testing took longer than expected. The devices improve the performance in dark and demanding conditions. The expected life span of these devices is 6-10 years and they can be used also in Frontex-operations. This is also an EUROSUR project.</p> <p>The project of renewing patrol vehicles contribute to the capability of land borders surveillance which is heavily based on the mobility of patrols (all-terrain). These vehicle are in very heavy use and thus they need to be regularly renewed. The vehicles need to be equipped for example with communication and management systems which are compatible with the systems of the</p>
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	<p>authorities. The plan was to acquire patrol vehicles, snowmobiles and of-road vehicles. By May 2017, the snowmobiles and the patrol vehicles had been received and outfitted. This is also an EUROSUR project.</p> <p>The project of creating maintenance capacity to service vessels' camera sensors was set up to secure the technical maintenance of the equipment. The camera system improves the capability to detect and identify targets in maritime areas. The purpose of the project is to acquire spare parts and maintenance contracts for camera sensors. The project will not be accomplished in a set schedule due to challenges in the procurement process (information from the supplier). This is also an EUROSUR project.</p> <p>The project of Upgrading of helicopters surveillance capabilities is needed to secure the continuity for external border surveillance from aircrafts through their life span. This also improves the ability to spot and follow objects in different lighting and weather conditions. The project will acquire an EOS-camera system including installation, training and supporting parts. The project will not be accomplished in the set schedule. According to the latest information it will be accomplished by the end of year 2018.</p> <p>The project of acquiring of light E-boat contributes to closer operation with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. The project was managed successfully including the bidding process and project planning. The boat was built and evaluated successfully and a lot of important information was received to develop this boat series. The boat takes part in borders surveillance activities and in Frontex-operations for decades.</p> <p>Developing the technical surveillance of the sea border and land border (see paragraph 1.2.5). These are also EUROSUR projects.</p>
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1.2.2	<p>What progress was made towards carrying out checks on persons and monitoring efficiently the crossing of external borders, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?</p>
	<p>There are four projects which support the progress towards carrying out checks on persons and monitoring efficiently the crossing of external borders.</p> <p>The MOBILE-RATAS project was set up to develop a mobile application for carrying out border checks. The application which was in use earlier was outdated and thus the implementation of a new application was crucial. The developed mobile application meets the current technical and operational requirements and can make better use of the features of the current border check devices. As the application assists in streamlining the performance of border checks, it is also of vital importance in the preparation for possible increases in cross-border traffic.</p> <p>The project of developing environment for managing the travel document</p>

	<p>certificates produced a management system which qualifies for international standards and information security. The project was well managed and achieved its targets. Its main benefit is increased security. The system enables managing certificates from other countries and the distribution of Finnish certificates by using the ICAO-PKD service. Before, both management and distribution needed to be done manually and, for example, following the validity of the certificates was laborious. Based on our interviews this means that the checking of certificates is now more systematic, partly automatic, more reliable (up-to-date), there is more information available and the information is available faster. It is also reported that the system is user-friendly and efficient which reduces working time and mistakes. This contributes to the smooth crossing of the external borders in conformity. Achieving all this progress otherwise by now would most likely not have been possible as the national funding was dependent on the granted EU-funding.</p> <p>One project was set up to purchase document readers for portable border control devices. Document readers can be used with portable border control devices e.g. on trains and they enable the verification of authenticity of travelling documents with chips. This is found important for improving security. The plan was to acquire portable devices, however not enough time had been budgeted for the technical and commercial process and thus this project was put on hold. Based on our interview, the issue was the procurement law that was updated. It included still some unclear articles related to border checks. It was also dependent of the MOBILE RATAS project.</p> <p>Improving Russian language (see 1.2.4) skills of the border authorities was found as an important factor in borders checks. Better language skills are expected to increase the effectiveness of certain tasks in borders check and thus contributes to carrying out the checks on persons and to monitoring efficiently the crossing of external borders.</p>
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1.2.3	<p>What progress was made towards establishing gradually an integrated management system for external borders, based on solidarity and responsibility, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?</p>
	<p>There was one project funded by the ISF which especially supported an integrated management system for external borders. The project developed a national-level environment for managing the travel document certificates of cross-border passengers and an interface with the international ICAO Public Key Directory. The project was successful even though it faced some challenges which caused some delays. However the project managed to stay in budget and to achieve its targets. The management system was installed on 551 workstations. As a result this project produced a management system which qualifies international standards and information security.</p>

1.2.4	What progress was made towards ensuring the application of the Union's acquis on border management, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?
	<p>As a result of the Schengen-audit, Finland was recommend to pay attention to the Russian language skills of the border authority staff. As a response to this the development and strengthening of the Russian language training project started and the availability of ISF-funding had a remarkable contribution to that. This project contributes to ensuring the application of the Union's acquis on border management by improving the Russian language training of the border authorities' staff. This is expected to increase the effectiveness of certain tasks as well as to improving the quality of customer service. This will also contribute to the smooth crossing and taking into account the basic rights of the passengers. The project is still ongoing but so far 3 out of 6 courses have been arranged and each course is expected to have about 20 participants. It should be noted that the impact of this project is expected to be much wider and longer-term than just courses arranged during the project, as the emphasis has been in the development of the course material. This is web-based material for the teacher and the student and it also includes self-study material and a handbook. The handbook is available in electronic format and has guidance in vocabulary and for conversations.</p> <p>Also the project which was set up to modify a border guard training vessel supported this objective. This fits the Union objective on improving border security training and as a result of this project, trainings conforming to EU requirements can be provided. So far 3 trainings of 6 have been arranged. The course can be up to 10 weeks long. This project has a long term impact as the Border Guard now has a modern and cost-effective training vessel which can be used in a variety of educational situations related to border security training. Yet the contribution of the ISF-fund for this project was rather low as the majority of the project's expenditures were rejected. The main reason for this was that the procurement process for the docking service was not properly conducted.</p>

1.2.5	What progress was made towards contributing to reinforcing situational awareness at the external borders and the reaction capabilities of Member States, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?
	<p>There was a total of four projects which reinforce situational awareness at the external borders and the reaction capabilities of Finland. All of these were under national objective 1.</p> <p>The first project was the production and development of the Border Surveillance and Situation Picture application RASTI. The Border Guard developed in this project a situation picture system which is also in joint use with other security authorities. According to the final report, the developed system has proved to be effective, high-quality and has a high level information security set as a target. There was some delays in its operative implementation but on the</p>

	<p>other hand this enabled the implementation of a truly functional system. The key success factor was testing the application in different phases. Contribution of the Fund for this project was significantly lower than for other projects, as a significant portion of the expenditure occurred before the start of the project and was therefore rejected as ineligible. Further development of the Border Surveillance and Situation Picture application RASTI will continue with the second project which started in April 2017.</p> <p>The third project was the development of a situational picture systems by improving live video streaming of mobile units. The modernizing of data transfer system has enabled video picture sharing with border surveillances systems. According to the final report this has improved the situation picture and the surveillance by aircrafts is now more effective. Also testing the information transfer platform produced the information needed. The first phase of the testing was successful and video picture can be transferred and saved to the cloud. Unfortunately the second phase, transferring data from the cloud to the other National Security Network (TUVE) environment failed due to unexpected reasons not depending on the Border Guard.</p> <p>The fourth project was preparing and providing upgraded premises for the NCC. A new “Border house“ was built to the capital area in 2016 and there was a plan to locate the new NCC-centre there. Earlier the NCC-functions were divided between three locations which does not conform to the Eurosur security decree and 24/7 operative requirements. The ISF-fund contributed to the actions related to preparing the premises to meet the security requirements, as well as to acquiring and integrating the technique needed. Some changes to the allocation of the funds inside the project was done, which served however the program objectives and were thus found reasonable and accepted. It can be said that as according to the final report, the NCC- centre conforms now to Eurosur-requirements and has the ability to produce a 24/7 situational picture. It has reinforced the situational awareness at the external borders and the reaction capabilities of Finland.</p>
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1.2.6	<p>What progress was made towards setting up and running IT systems, their communication infrastructure and equipment that support border checks and border surveillance at the external borders, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?</p>
	<p>There were several IT systems- related projects funded under the ISF. Three of them were related to application development:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The production and development of a border surveillance and situational picture application RASTI (see paragraph 1.2.5) • Further development of the border surveillance and situational picture application RASTI (see paragraph 1.2.5) • MOBILE-RATAS, Mobile application for carrying out border

	<p>checks. The project was set up as the application which was in use was outdated and thus the implementation of a new application was crucial. The development of a Mobile application was also part of the SIS II-system development. (see paragraph 1.2.2)</p> <p>Live video streaming of the mobile units focused on modernizing data transfer system. Preparing and providing upgraded premises for the NCC project included the integration of management and presentation systems in the ICT systems. These projects are described in paragraph 1.2.5</p> <p>Progress was also made towards setting up and running IT systems, their communication infrastructure and equipment that support land and sea border surveillance, as the related technique required development. This is particularly important, as according to the EU legislation, Finland must maintain a credible surveillance of the areas between border crossing points. The surveillance of EU external borders In Finland is increasingly based on technical surveillance, as human resources are reduced.</p> <p>The Land border technical surveillance project was set up to sustain and develop land border surveillance. The systems which were planned to be developed were essential to border surveillance. The land border surveillance technology system needed updating and further development to meet the requirements of the border surveillance technology system and the new RASTI-application. However, the project was able to accomplish only one functionality out of four, due to the problems which were not obvious when project was planned. Based on our interview, it was found out that there is no point in updating and old system as it is expected not to be updatable in the near future. Thus it will be more effective to renew the system and the project was suspended. The accomplished functionality turned out to be a good investment even if it was first reported that it does not match the needs. It was not suitable to the southern Finnish border with lots of small roads, but when it was transferred northwards, with larger restricted road areas, it served much better.</p> <p>The other project was set up to sustain sea border surveillance technical capacity by continuing the renewal of sea surveillance radars and peripheral devices, and by developing sea surveillance software. The target is to improve the situation picture at the national level. Sea surveillance pictures are shared not only with other national authorities but also internationally with cooperation authorities. The project is still on-going and some delays are expected. The project continues until end of the year 2017.</p>
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1.2.7	How did the operating support provided for in Article 10 of the Regulation (EU) No 515/2014 contribute to the achievement of the specific objective on border management?
	According to the evaluation there are three projects that contribute to border management. The EU funding amounts to 6 569 440 EUR for this objective. The special objective made it possible to gain funding for on-going activities, which

	<p>was not possible previously. The addition of operational support was very welcome.</p> <p>The first project deals with the maintenance and operating costs of offshore patrol vessels. The aim is to preserve the offshore patrol vessels operational for as long as possible. This is done by doing larger maintenance actions at the dock and smaller bug fixes according to need. The project secures the EU offshore border control on the Gulf of Finland. The project has been successful and has funded the operating expenses for two offshore patrol vessels for almost two years.</p> <p>The second project deals with SIS II IT-operations and maintenance. The aim is to organise the EU wide SIS II system for national use, maintenance and support. The Schengen IT system (SIS II) is in use at the Border Control, Customs, Police, Immigrations and Foreign Ministry. The system is in use 24/7 by the authorities. The project has been carried out by securing the operational ability of the system by regular maintenance and support activities.</p> <p>The third project deals with the personnel costs of National Coordination Centre. The aim is to secure the 24/7 operations of the national coordination centre NCC. The NCC analytical personnel produce snapshot of the current national state for the EUROSUR-system. The NCC maintains and analyses the national, European and border area common intelligence situation through the EUROSUR IT-system. The activities are based on the EU regulation N:o 1052/2013, on establishing the European border control system EUROSUR. The EUROSUR system is needed for an improved situation awareness and reaction capabilities on the outer borders of EU Member States, the aim is to detect and prevent illegal immigration and cross-border crime. The EUROSUR creates a common framework for the Member States and Frontex information sharing and cooperation for better situational awareness and reaction capabilities.</p>
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1.3	Specific objective 5: Crime / ISF-P Article 3(2)(a)
	<p>The overall question: How did the Fund contribute to the following specific objectives: - Prevention of cross-border, serious and organised crime, including terrorism? - Reinforcement of the coordination and cooperation between law enforcement authorities and other national authorities of Member States, including with Europol or other relevant Union bodies, and with relevant third countries and international organisations?</p>
	<p>Specific Objective 5 deals with Crime prevention and focuses on combating organised crime, terrorism, violent extremism and radicalisation, cybercrime and economic crime. The witness protection program as well as the activities related to the forthcoming National Witness Protection Act fall within this Specific Objective. The key areas of development according to the National Programme are: IT systems, witness protection and victim support, fight against cybercrime and the financial aspects of crime.</p>

	<p>The changes in operational environment has meant that there have been minor changes in the implementation of anti-radicalisation measures even as it has been a theme before as well. The changes amount to 230 000 EUR and funds were reallocated within SO 6.</p> <p>There are a total of 26 projects funded under SO 5, amounting to the worth of 10 338 964,87 EUR of EU funding. The biggest beneficiary was the National Police Board. Other beneficiaries were the Border Guard, Customs, and two projects were implemented by the NGO Pro Tukipiste ry and The Finnish Association for Medical Health.</p> <p>The projects that dealt with the prevention of cross-border, serious and organised crime, including terrorism, are presented under 1.3.1. The projects were implemented by the National Police Board and Customs, and dealt with the development and training of IT systems, IT architecture and telemonitoring.</p> <p>The projects that dealt with the reinforcement of the coordination and cooperation between law enforcement authorities and other national authorities of the Member States, including with Europol or other relevant Union bodies, and with relevant third countries and international organisations, are presented under 1.3.2. The projects were implemented by the National Police Board, the Finnish Border Guard, and the Finnish Customs. The projects dealt with establishing a cybercrime centre, obtaining equipment for the identification of designer drugs and night vision capabilities, and creating methods for preventing money laundering.</p>
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1.3.1	<p>What progress was made towards the achievement of the expected results of strengthening Member States' capacity to combat cross-border, serious and organised crime, including terrorism and to reinforce their mutual cooperation in this field, and how did the Fund contribute to the achievement of this progress?</p>
	<p>There were 17 projects that deal with combatting cross-border, serious and organised crime. Of these 17, 10 had this as a main focus. The other 7 are explained under 1.3.2. Several actions deal with cybercrime IT-system development. Since cybercrime is on the rise, it is of high significance to take action to develop against this risk.</p> <p>Increasing the scope of an IT system for analysing purposes (TOIVO) aims to make the extension of the IT system cover economic crime prevention. The result is that the risk of revelation and getting caught increase, and the investigation time is shortened. Large-scale crime analysis with big amounts of data can now be done, which had not been possible previously. The system is built for common use between law enforcement authorities. There are no alternative systems in sight for the future, so the project is long-term in nature. The project has been successful as it has met its goal, the system is in use and is performing well.</p> <p>Two actions dealt with the development and further development of the case</p>

management system for classified coercive methods, SALPA, which is a national IT-system used to manage documents, permit processes and requests for information. The users of the system are the Police, the Border Guard and Defence Forces. The workload of the personnel is facilitated, since the processes of data acquisition is made uniform and faster. In SALPA II, the system is further developed to take into account the VITJA-system timetable and alignments. The VITJA-system is funded with national funding. VITJA is the replacement for PATJA information system of the authorities that compiles data collected from Finnish citizens.

PATJA life cycle extending. PATJA is the central operational IT system for the prevention of crime. The aim is to secure the technical quality of the IT system and its functional coverage, which is critical for the Police forces during the entire life cycle of the system. The project has been delayed somewhat but the delays were justified and certain functions are still being carried out.

Open source intelligence, aims to expose crime in the web, to collect data e.g. from the Darknet and to combine it to operative information in order to target the operative actions. The project aims at increasing operational cost effectiveness and the risk of criminals getting caught. The project is still ongoing.

Telecommunication interception system and technical information acquisition. The system is utilized on almost all serious crime fronts, and is acting as an important tool for preventing and investigating serious crimes. The goal is to get functioning interfaces between the systems and to prevent costs due to overlapping. The effects are that serious crime is prevented and the significance of tele monitoring is advanced as a means of investigative measure in serious crime. The system is in use, although some aspects were delayed.

With regards to processes and quality control, one project focuses on the **facilitation of the accreditation of Finnish Crime Scene Units**. The project is based on the framework decision of the European Council. The project aims at developing an internationally accredited quality control system (ISO 17025) for DNA- and fingerprint ex post investigations. All Police departments have committed personnel resources to this action. Previously there was not enough resources to develop the system according to standards. The project is of high significance as there has not been uniform national processes in place and the functions have a vast reach on improving crime investigation through uniform processes. The improved quality and more uniform crime investigations are expected to increase the legal protection as well as the risk of getting caught.

Preventive Police action establishes processes for the prevention of extremism and radicalisation by educating Police forces. Practices are made uniform across the country. There is an aspect of developing models for local problem solving, since some areas need tailored information on extremism and radicalisation. The project is ongoing, but the training offered has made Police readiness vastly broader, and the meeting of different nationals more natural.

Other actions dealt with developing information based action. The project named **development of operative analysis and knowledge-based management of resources**, where the Police acquires readiness to do preventative, targeted and

	<p>effective police action. Information sharing is better enabled, and preventing vulnerable young people from being recruited as part of organised crime groups. The system architecture of dataset handling in police operations aims at developing an information architecture and implementing multipurpose, cost-effective IT-solution for the recording, handling and analyzing large data files.</p>
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1.3.2	<p>What progress was made towards developing administrative and operational coordination and cooperation among Member States' public authorities, Europol or other relevant Union bodies and, where appropriate, with third countries and international organisations, and how did the Fund contribute to the achievement of this progress?</p>
	<p>There were 7 projects that focused on developing administrative and operational coordination and cooperation among Member State's public authorities, Europol or other relevant union bodies and with third countries and international organisations.</p> <p>Several projects deal with cybercrime and money laundering. One project deals with the creation of a cybercrime centre, which was established on 15.4.2015 and has 45 employees. During the project, information has been gathered on the security platform and developing IT investigation. The aim is that the Police have efficient prerequisites to prevent, discover and find out crimes directed towards the cyber operating environment. The project is national, and will affect all Police, Customs and Border Guard authorities. It has an international dimension through Europol, Interpol and the cooperation with certain countries, since the Police authorities share knowledge and do development work with these entities at a daily basis.</p> <p>One project aims at finding means of identifying and recognizing funding of terrorism and money laundering and developing new action models to reveal, defend and investigate terrorism funding and money laundering. Thus far the project has been active in the processes of mapping threats, benchmarking targets, attaining trace program software in conjunction with the BITCOIN-JIT project, and organising schooling for law enforcement by national and international seminars. The project aims at finding effective prevention methods for the area of virtual currencies, crime, and money laundering and criminal benefit. The international cooperation and wide cooperation of authorities differ from the day to day crime investigation methods, and operative cooperation can become more effective by additional funding. This is carried out by the mapping of virtual currencies and building a threat scenario, establishing international investigative and analytical groups. The project is still ongoing, thus far a forensic IT expert has visited the Europol/Interpol cybercrime investigation unit and learnt especially about virtual currencies, which has made a substantial contribution to creating a national threat assessment.</p> <p>One project deals with the development for information sharing in field operations, in order to prevent crime by developing and promoting information sharing between authorities through the use of a centralized, unique IT system</p>

	<p>solution (KEJO-system). The IT systems of different actors are integrated into the KEJO-system. The project is national but cooperates internationally with authorities, and information is shared between countries on expert level. The project has been delayed due to changes in contract negotiations.</p> <p>Some projects deal with procurement or equipment for preventative crime action. One project deals with condensed phase GC-FTIR for fighting drug crime. The aim is to acquire the first condensed phase CG-FTIR -device to the Customs, in order to be able to identify designer drugs. The project has been delayed, the procurement process has been finalized but the equipment has not yet been delivered. The measuring results gained from the new equipment will be shared with the EMCDDA (European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction) through the information system EDND.</p> <p>Another project deals with special intervention units' optronical devices. The aim is to improve the performance of the Border Guard in preventing of terror crime, by requiring sufficient amounts of optronic devices for the special task units within the Border Guard. The maintaining of night vision capability is a central part of the special unit performance, without it there is an uncontrolled safety risk and shortage in tactical performance. The performance capabilities are used in Frontex -coordinated border control operations outside the EU external border. The project has been successful as the optronic devices have been obtained and are in use.</p> <p>One project deals with mapping the current state of administrative crime prevention and the methods used for crime prevention. Then a national model for action is created in order to weaken the operating conditions of organised and severe crime. International best practices are mapped out and taken into consideration when establishing the model. This has been carried out through research of the current status of organised crime prevention, mapping European and international models of operating, developing an action model, developing legislation and piloting a national action model. The project is ongoing.</p>
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1.3.3	<p>What progress was made towards developing training schemes, such as those regarding technical and professional skills and knowledge of obligations on human rights and fundamental freedoms, in implementation of EU training policies, including through specific Union law enforcement exchange programmes, and how did the Fund contribute to the achievement of this progress?</p>
	<p>There are three projects that deal with the development of training schemes. All projects also have an international dimension that responds to 1.3.2. with regards to international cooperation and coordination, but particularly the FINSIU project also responds to this. The projects are explained below.</p> <p>Two projects deal with cybercrime. One is on cyber competence, where the aim is to develop a qualitative and effective cyber-crime prevention study program for the Police University College by the year 2020. The aim is to give the</p>

	<p>students (officials) the theoretical and practical skills in the cyber operating environment. The aim is also to prevent, discover and investigate cyber operation environment crimes and add this to the Police University College courses. In the development of the courses, cyber research results are used and cooperation established with national and international stakeholders. The project is still ongoing. The second project also deals with cybercrime education. The aim of the project is to take action to develop qualitative and effective cyber-crime prevention for Police and other authorities. Special emphasis is placed upon educational actions. The opportunity to participate in training is given to the Police and other authorities (Customs, Border Control, Defense Forces and possibly other authorities). The aim is to give authorities theoretical and practical skills in the cyber operating environment, and to prevent, discover and investigate cyber operation crimes. There is cooperation with national and international stakeholders, through the Nordic Computer Forensic Investigators program (NCFI). So far 14 police investigators and 10 police officials have received training.</p> <p>The third project deals with FINSIU (Finnish Special Intervention Units) - trainings, to develop the cooperation between different EU countries by practicing special interventions to increase the readiness, responsiveness and preparedness of authorities. There is international cooperation in the project both bilaterally and multilaterally. Thus far the actions taken consist of the planning of joint exercises, taking part in a Danish maritime exercise on 25.4.-30.4.2016, organising the Atlas Entry practice seminar in Finland for 45 persons from Finland and 26 from other European countries, taking part in the Viro2016-exercise, and organising a common exercise in Finland for a police led situation (such as terrorism). Since the project is international in nature it therefore also responds to 1.3.2.</p>
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1.3.4	<p>What progress was made towards putting in place measures, safeguard mechanisms and best practices for the identification and support of witnesses and victims of crime, including victims of terrorism, and how did the Fund contribute to the achievement of this progress?</p>
	<p>Based on the evaluation there are six projects that deal with the identification and support of witnesses and victims of crime.</p> <p>One project aims at creating stepping stones for identification in dialogue by forming a uniform criterion for NGOs to recognize victims of human trafficking and to give them the tools to help steer victims towards help. This has been done through mapping the current state of knowledge of human trafficking in Finland by interviews, developing tools to help recognise victims and taking up the subject in conversations by creating animations to illustrate the situation that can be sensitive to bring up in conversations and organising three workshops on the matter for people who might encounter victims of human trafficking. Another project deals with anti-trafficking training and communications, by creating a platform for multidisciplinary cooperation and national activity for the prevention and recognition of human trafficking victims and for steering them</p>

towards help. International and Finnish knowledge and experience is shared on human trafficking. Human trafficking victims in Finland have been helped systematically for almost 10 years. This project makes the recognition of victims and the knowledge of helping activities better known in cooperation with the Tampere film festival. A large seminar for authorities has been organised, with 5 international speakers and 12 Finnish experts. 179 experts attended the seminar.

Another project deals with **visitor activities in the courts**, by developing a model for supporting the witnesses in court trials, who may fear for their safety and therefore want to modify their witness statements. The model will entail a model for the volunteers on call to support victims and also a model for the witnesses on information about witnessing. This has been done thus far by developing an educational program, organising pilot trainings for the educational program – thus far 100 volunteers participating who have been trained and by compiling a guide for witnesses.

One project is technical in nature. The project aims at **enabling the execution of the crime victim directive** (2012/29/EU) by renewing the IT systems of the justice administration that has to do with crime victim payment. This is done by planning and developing the necessary changes to legislation in the IT systems that deal with crime victim payment, then defining the changes to the system, and developing the renewal of forms. The system is in place and the effect is that payments are able to be coordinated towards supporting crime victims.

One project is related to the Istanbul Convention IV article 24 (Protection and support) where it is stated that all member states should have a national free 24/7 telephone helpline in place for crime victims. Finland has previously had several telephone helplines, but none of them have been operating 24/7. A **24/7 telephone helpline** directed towards women experiencing violence or violence from their immediate family was established on 1.12.2016. The helpline is free of charge for callers and anonymous, and acts as a service of low threshold. The helpline is in place permanently even after the project has ended.

One project deals with **witness protection**. In March 2015, the Witness Protection Act (88/2015) was ratified in Finland. The aim of the project was to assure that all statutory obligations will be implemented. This included acquiring the relevant technique, developing operative actions and initiating EXIT-actions. The funding contributed not only to secure operational preconditions but also to the accomplishment of the needed development activities. It also enabled an extensive study of the possible operational models for breakaways from organised crime groups and the preparation of concrete actions. The plan is to take the operational models in use during the year 2017. The project was not able to use all allocated funding as some expenses were smaller than expected and some acquisitions were not done due the unavailability of technical solutions. Also suitable benchmarking destinations from abroad were not found and thus the benchmarking information from abroad remained rather insubstantial.

1.4	Specific objective 6: Risks & crisis / ISF-P Article 3(2)(b)
	<p>The overall question: How did the Fund contribute to improve the capacity of Member States to manage effectively security-related risks and crises, and protecting people and critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks and other security-related incidents?</p>
	<p>Specific Objective 6 deals with risks and crisis, and includes the protection of persons and infrastructure against various threats and the preparedness of various authorities. Much emphasis is put on CBRNE (abbreviation that comes from: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives) issues covering equipment and training, and anti-radicalisation measures is another major topic within SO 6.</p> <p>The capacity was improved by increasing CBRNE awareness, increasing the knowledge of CBRNE among first responders, acquiring equipment that detects and recognizes CBRNE substances on the field.</p> <p>Within SO 6 a total of 7 projects have been funded. The beneficiaries were the Police Board, Laurea University of Applied Sciences, Mikkeli Development Miksei Ltd, Finn Church Aid, Emergency Service College and Tampere Regional Rescue Department.</p> <p>The projects related to improving the capacity of the Member States to manage effectively security-related risks and crises, and to protecting people and critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks and other security-related incidents are explained under 1.4.1. The projects were implemented by Mikkeli Development Miksei Ltd, Emergency Service College, Tampere Regional Rescue Department and the National Police Board.</p>

1.4.1	<p>What progress was made towards reinforcing Member States' administrative and operational capability to protect critical infrastructure in all sectors of economic activity, including through public-private partnerships and improved coordination, cooperation, exchange and dissemination of know-how and experience within the Union and with relevant third countries, and how did the Fund contribute to the achievement of this progress?</p>
	<p>Based on the evaluation there were three projects that focused on the administrative and operational capability to protect critical infrastructure. The projects deal with CBRNE.</p> <p>One project aims at increasing the knowledge of CBRNE among first responders, recognizing the preventative actions, developing operational readiness and working safety and cooperation between authorities. The aim is to organise two module based CBRNE-schooling sets during a year, to which at least 20 actors take part. The project develops safety strategies for the society to protect itself against destruction and terrorist threats by preparing for CBRNE threats. The leading authorities who decide on actions in these situations are also given a content frame based on the schooling they take part in. The project also</p>

	<p>makes use of the previous cooperation between different actors by taking these action models into account.</p> <p>The second project aims at increasing the CBRNE awareness and cooperative actions in situations caused by criminal action, through training courses offered for local authorities (police, emergency services and paramedics). 4-6 courses will be arranged and approximately 88-132 persons will receive schooling in the matter. The course participants gain further knowledge and action models for CBRNE and the local cooperation of authorities is increased.</p> <p>The third project aims at developing the operational action capacity and readiness for accidents in the rescue departments caused by criminal CBRNE-threats, by increasing the readiness to recognize different chemical substances and the treats derived from them. This is done by obtaining CBRNE substance analyzers which will enable the recognition of substances and make efforts faster and more effective. The aim is to develop the national readiness and ability to recognize the substances used according to the EU CBRNE action plan and the national CBRNE strategy. The different authorities' action capabilities and role in criminal CBRNE situations are taken into account so that the readiness and action capabilities as a whole are developed on a national level, to support the national and international threats.</p> <p>The fourth project aims at acquiring portable equipment for the Police forces to utilize as first hand responders on the field in CBRNE situations. The equipment will detect and recognize CBRNE substances on the field, thus the capacity to detect substances immediately is made possible. The police have not had on the spot capabilities before, and thus the equipment is needed. So far there have been preparations for the procurement of 6 analysers.</p>
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1.4.2	<p>What progress was made towards establishing secure links and effective coordination between existing sector-specific early warning and crisis cooperation actors at Union and national level, and how did the Fund contribute to the achievement of this progress?</p>
	<p>There are two projects that focus on establishing secure links and effective coordination between the existing sector-specific early warning and crisis cooperation actors.</p> <p>The first project deals with the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism in university setting, by developing a model for safety work in universities. There have been few projects on the subject in Finland and none in a university settings. There is a strong need for a functioning preventative model since studies have shown that the site for attacks is most commonly one of the following: prison, school or Internet. Extremist thinking is more prevalent in young people and young adults and a large portion of them spend a lot of time in school settings. Therefore actions could be detected and prevented where the potential perpetrators are. It can be detected in attitudes, such as anger and intolerance, and the attitudes create the base for actions. The model was</p>

	<p>developed by doing a benchmarking study to learn about Britain’s practices in radicalisation prevention in universities, to learn about the use of physical spaces, IT-infrastructure and the role of education in prevention. Then a written report on university quality control systems and ethical values and teaching was done, and ensuring an E-education packet for university personnel.</p> <p>The second project aims at strengthening society's readiness to prevent VE (violent extremism) and radicalisation and supporting the individual suffering from the phenomena, and enhancing cooperation of the authorities and the third sector. The project supports authorities, different religious communities and organisations cooperation in networking by organising international and national seminars on the subject. An international seminar for the Nordics have been organised with approximately 40 participants, meetings with stakeholders, one info session for 30 participants, thereby developing network-based cooperation in different forums.</p>
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1.4.3	<p>What progress was made towards improving the administrative and operational capacity of the Member States and the Union to develop comprehensive threat and risk assessments, and how did the Fund contribute to the achievement of this progress?</p>
	<p>Based on the evaluation there was one project with focus on improving the administrative and operational capacity to develop comprehensive threat and risk assessment. The aim of the project is to develop risk control and prevention in service providers and authorities in crises situations that effect the critical infrastructure. This is done by developing day to day tools for risk control and a simulation method for evaluating the information sharing between private and public sector and authorities. A self-assessment tool is tailored towards service providers (stress test) which is piloted at the end of the project.</p>

2	Efficiency
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2	<p>The overall question: Were the results of the Fund achieved at reasonable cost?</p>
	<p>Based on the observations made during the evaluation the general objectives of the fund (visa policy, borders, operational support, crime, risks & crisis) were received at a fairly reasonable cost in terms of financial and resources deployment.</p> <p>The total cost of the ISF budget, divided between 62 projects, is 31 485 146, 08</p>

EUR of which EU funding consisted of 25 422 098, 03 EUR. By 30.6.2017 the funding that had been paid consisted of 10 054 290, 66 EUR, which amounts to a total of 32 % of the total funding for the projects. Since a large number of projects have not yet received funding, it can be concluded that some objectives have yet to gain results and therefore the general picture of the objectives met can be distorted, as actions have not been finalized. 25 projects have been concluded, so there are still 37 projects ongoing.

Based on our interviews, there is **an economic analysis** in place to evaluate whether the costs are realistic and reasonable. During the evaluation of which actions to fund, the Responsible Authority (RA) does an economic evaluation on the actions with regard to budgeting. The RA does the evaluation based on background information and if necessary, acquires further information. The costs are extensive within the ISF funded actions, as a large part of them deal with the procurement of technical equipment. The RA does a cost evaluation before choosing which projects to fund, considering whether the costs are realistic, budgeted higher or lower than necessary. If necessary, the RA cuts the costs of the funded actions with regard to their targets. This is done in cooperation with the beneficiary.

The projects can be divided into separate categories based on their reach – IT-systems or processes that serve several or one authority (vast effects), and projects that have a moderate reach such as specific trainings offered to police forces.

Some projects also dealt with actions that had not previously been in place, e.g. national telephone 24/7 helpline, but now the development of actions took place.

The projects that are cost heavy (amount to over 500 000 EUR) :

- National Visa Information System development SUVICVIS
- SUVISCVIS6 project for further improving the SUVI visa information system
- Production and development of Border Surveillance and Situation Picture application RASTI
- Maintenance and operating costs of offshore patrol vessels
- SIS II IT-operations and maintenance
- Personnel costs of National Coordination Centre
- IT systems of acquiring technical information, TELEPA
- System architecture of dataset handling in police operations (Timantti)
- KYBOL, cyber defence centre
- Special intervention units' optronical devices
- Development project for information sharing in field operations (Kejo-

	<p>Vitike)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cyber competence 2020 • Cyber education • The identification and analyse of substances (solid, liquid and gas) used in criminal CBRNE situations • Vulnerability of critical infrastructure and operational capability of authorities
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2.1	<p>To what extent were the expected results of the Fund achieved at reasonable cost in terms of deployed financial and human resources?</p>
	<p>Of the 62 projects funded by the Fund, there were 3 projects that were HR heavy projects (HR costs amount to over 75 %). As can be expected, the HR heavy projects deal mostly with development of operating models, methodologies and training material.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RAVET, model for anti-radicalisation in university setting • TERHA, identifying and recognising funding of terrorism and money laundering • Personnel costs of National Coordination Centre, producing the situational picture of the current national state for the EUROSUR-system. <p>One project had quite heavy HR costs (55%): Russian language training. The remaining 58 projects, where the HR costs were smaller or non-existing, dealt mostly with the development of IT-systems or applications, or the acquisition of equipment. There was also one project which included heavy travel costs (95%).</p> <p>The human resources costs are evaluated by the Responsible Authority during the application phase, in order to detect if the amount of work is reasonable or not. Also benchmarking is done against actions taken in previous program periods, to decide whether the costs of human resources are reasonably budgeted. The administrative support activities are not fundable and monitoring the worktime of the part time employees is mandatory. However, the worktime of full time personnel is not monitored, and it can be discussed if this should be required as well or if it is against the goal of decreasing administrative burden. When conducting audits there is a check in place in order to make sure that only the realized costs are taken into account. Calculated costs are not accepted.</p> <p>When dealing with acquisitions, professional procurement practice plays an</p>

	<p>important role. Large and complex IT projects have a tendency to fail in efficiency, especially if there are several IT-projects with strong dependencies. To assure the success of these projects it is important to have a professional team in place. There was one good example of an IT system project, development of national level environment for managing the travel document certificates, which was a success due the very professional project management and project team. The requirements and options available were investigated carefully beforehand, which enabled a quality bidding process. The team had substance and technical knowledge as well as experience in project management and procurement. On the other hand, there was also some projects where probably better planning and/or experience would have secured better success.</p>
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2.2	<p>What measures were put in place to prevent, detect, report and follow up on cases of fraud and other irregularities, and how did they perform?</p>
	<p>The main measures for eliminating fraud and other irregularities are taken by the RA during the evaluation phase, where actions are evaluated based on whether they should receive funding. The evaluation process relies on the fact that projects need to meet certain criteria, for example in regard to targets of the NP but also in regard of the targets of a singular project.</p> <p>During the evaluation of which projects to fund, the RA does a comprehensive risk assessment of each chosen project. If possible risks are identified, the RA interferes and takes actions before the decision to fund is taken. The actions may include benchmarking towards previous projects or enquiring additional information from the beneficiary on the risk in question. This way the RA attempts to address and intervene into possible risks before any funding is given.</p> <p>According to the interviews, more responsibility has been directed to the RA by the EU Commission since the previous SOLID –funding period. This has provided the RA more authority to organise the financial risk management procedures of the fund. However, the EU Commission has provided some requirements to ensure that there is sufficient alignment of controls in each of the MS.</p> <p>The preparation and implementation team supports beneficiaries in initiating a project and in commencing the funded actions. It also participates in the steering groups meetings. Possible fraud during the implementation period falls mainly on the control and audit team at the RA administration and development department. This is separate from the preparation team. During the current funding period, each project is required to conduct an external audit as part of the final project reporting. The control and audit team of the RA does quality control and economic audits on the projects. The Finnish Government Shared Services Centre for Finance and HR (Palkeet Management system) is utilised to check the payments for actions, so that the correct funds are placed in the correct bank accounts. The beneficiaries are systematically checked for signatory rights persons, and are requested to have a power of attorney in place so that the beneficiary organisation is always aware of which funding has been applied for,</p>

	<p>and for how much. . Financials are also reviewed by the RA during the project implementation period and the RA’s comments on the financial reports are documented as part of the reports. Economic audit checks are placed for ineligible costs or if there has been issues with procurement delays that require the funding to be recovered. There has been some minor findings and in those cases expenses has been rejected.</p> <p>When dealing with public procurement there is always a risk of the procurement process or the actions being delayed. In order to cover this risk changes were made to legislation so that no advance payments are given. The centre of gravity for funding has shifted to a later point in time for the projects which in turn is valuable from a risk control perspective.</p> <p>Also the legislation has changed so that the beneficiaries must be able to conduct the actions without EU funding as EU-fund is paid mainly against realized expenses. This is a way to delimit the most risky projects, so that a possible recovery of funds does not disrupt the whole action. On the other hand this creates challenges for the smaller non-governmental organisations to participate in the fund. This was also an area of discussion in the interviews with the RA representatives and beneficiaries. The down side is that the current template for funding proposal includes an own contribution requirement from each of the project partner and therefore this funding challenge cannot be overcome by partnering with a larger partner with more financial and administrative capacity.</p> <p>At the project level, beneficiaries are self-eliminating risks for example by following established project management processes and procurement processes. The RA also arranges training for each project organisation at the beginning of the project. This includes tailored comprehensive information about project implementation and reporting. General project management training for beneficiaries is arranged 2-3 times per year.</p> <p>Based on the interviews there are measures in place to prevent and detect fraud and other irregularities. The measures taken by the RA can be considered effective, since no significant fraud cases or irregularities have been detected. The irregularities where costs were rejected were mainly travel cost which were not directly related to the project, VAT costs, budget overrun and holiday pays. Also it was noted that in one case signatures were missing from the participant list. There was one project where the procurement process was not properly conducted and thus the majority of the project’s expenditure was declared ineligible.</p>
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3	Relevance
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3	The overall question: Did the objectives of the interventions funded by the Fund correspond to the
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	<p>actual needs?</p> <p>The status of internal security in Finland has changed since 2013. Changes in international politics, the increased threat of terrorism and number of asylum seekers have made the actions more relevant than ever.</p> <p>SO 1 Visa policy: The traffic across the eastern border has not increased as predicted and the abolition of visas between the EU and Russia is not actualizing. After the decline in the number of visa applications from Russia in 2016, it seems that the numbers are growing again. There is still a need to develop the visa systems. Facilitating legitimate travel and a better coverage of the visa service, the ILO –network and the development of SUVI are all still relevant.</p> <p>SO 2 Borders: the NP predicted that traffic across the eastern border would increase, so the main objective was to secure the capacity of the Border Control and to prepare for the possible increase in cross-border traffic. The political and economic situation in areas close to Finland has changed and now the priority of the border security in the east is to improve border surveillance. Even though the situation has changed, the objective still corresponds to the actual needs. Smart borders implementation is planned for the end of the framework period.</p> <p>SO 3 Operating support covers costs from maintaining the VIS and SIS II IT-systems and costs deriving from compulsory costs arising from border surveillance and check tasks. Support was relevant as IT systems and border surveillance actions are mandatory and changes in the operational environment in terms of illegal immigration impose new performance and preparedness requirements on surveillance at external borders.</p> <p>SO 5 Crime focuses on combating organised crime, terrorism, violent extremism and radicalisation, cybercrime and economic crime. The increased threat of terrorism, in both Europe and Finland, signify that the SO 5 is extremely relevant.</p> <p>SO 6 Risks & crises includes the protection of persons and infrastructure against various threats and the preparedness of various authorities. The operational environment has changed due to the high number of asylum seekers, as the number of victims from people smuggling and human trafficking are increasing. Digitalisation and the development of IT brings threats such as hybrid warfare and cybercrime, and the priority of CBRNE is increased with regards to handling substances that may have links to terrorism.</p>
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3.1	Did the objectives set by the Member State in their National Programmes respond to the identified needs?
	<p>Within SO 1 (Visa), the interventions responded to the national needs by e.g :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The needs related to the national capacity were responded by developing the national visa information system and by equipping border crossing

points with mobile devices for granting visa

- The identified needs related to the Union's protocol were responded by organising training for members of staff of consular services
- The identified needs related to the consular cooperation were responded by maintaining the network of liaison officers by placing liaison officers in Abuja and New Delhi to support the visa issuance process.

Within **SO 2 (Borders)**, the interventions responded to the national needs by e.g :

- The needs related to the EUROSUR were responded by upgrading the premises for the NCC, upgrading vessel systems, the production and development of a border surveillance and situation picture application, the development of a situational picture system by improving live video streaming of mobile units, the development of land border surveillance technology and modernization of patrol equipment in order to strengthen the border management capabilities.

The needs related to the Union's common requirements were responded by renewing border security training equipment by modifying a border vessel to meet the training needs, and by developing a national-level environment for managing the travel document certificates of cross-border passengers and the interface with the international ICAO Public Key Directory.

- The identified needs related to the Union's protocol were responded by improving Russian language training of the staff of border authorities.
- The identified needs related to the national capacity were responded by developing a mobile application for carrying out border checks and by supporting the liaison officer system by placing liaison officers in Moscow and Beijing
- The identified needs related to the Frontex-equipment were responded by the procurement of an evaluation boat NV15E

Within **SO 5 (Crime)**, the interventions responded to the national needs by e.g :

- Improving Police IT - architecture in order to combat crime related to the Internet setting
- Actions due to rising trends, such as cybercrime, extremism and anti-radicalisation. This was met by creating a cybercrime defense centre and organising trainings on cyber competence and prevention, developing models for the prevention of money laundering and crime related to virtual currencies, collecting data from the Darknet, and establishing processes for preventative action against extremism and radicalisation.
- Acquisition of necessary technical equipment to meet the needs of officials. This was done through acquiring the first condensed phase CG-

	<p>FTIR - measuring device in order to be able to recognize new forms of narcotics. The transformation of the molecule structure of narcotics has increased in recent years and led to laboratories needing more diverse analytical techniques to identify substances.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Securing necessary actions that have not been in place previously, such as large-scale crime analysis with big amounts of data, developing an internationally accredited quality control system (ISO 17025) for DNA- and fingerprint ex post investigations to ensure a uniform process nationally. • Actions regarding vulnerable groups, such as mapping the current state of knowledge of human trafficking and developing tools to help recognize victims, creating a platform for multidisciplinary cooperation and national activity to prevent and recognize human trafficking victims and to steer them towards help. Action is also taken to develop a model for supporting witnesses in court trials, to enable the execution of the crime victim directive (2012/29/EU) by renewing the IT systems at the administration of justice that deal with crime victim payment. Actions are also taken towards victims of home violence, by opening a 24/7 telephone line to help victims of violence. <p>Within SO 6 (Risks & crises), the interventions responded to the national needs by e.g.:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism by actions such as developing a model for safety work in universities, and strengthening society's readiness to prevent VE (violent extremism) and radicalisation by proper integration of persons who return to the Finnish society. • Developing CBRNE national cooperative actions, which are part of the counter terrorism strategy for 2014-2017 (Finnish government). Actions include organising CBRNE-training for operational actors, developing the operational action capacity and readiness for accidents caused by criminal CBRNE-threats in the rescue departments by increasing the readiness for recognizing different substances and the threats that derive from them. Also, technical equipment is acquired for the purpose of first hand responders on the field, as on site usable performance had not been in place previously.
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3.2	Which measures did the Member State put in place to address changing needs?
	The Responsible Authority (RA) made adjustments based on emerging needs when detected. The RA deleted smaller actions within SO 6 which did not materialise, and allocated the released funds to anti-radicalisation work to objective 6 anti-radicalisation interventions. This was due to the fact that there were certain national objectives that did not receive applications and therefore

	<p>the decision was made to transfer funding to objectives with larger needs. Due to the elevated threat of terrorism in Europe and terror attacks, the funds are now steered towards terrorism prevention.</p> <p>As a part of the Mid-Term review the RA has assessed their needs for the second half of the implementing period (2018-2020) in light of developments on the ground and political priorities, both at the EU and national level. This takes also into consideration the allocation of additional amounts (<i>top-ups</i>), the results of the EBCG vulnerability assessment, and their complementarity with EMAS funding.</p>
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4	Coherence
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4	<p>The overall question: Were the objectives set in the national programme coherent with the ones set in other programmes funded by EU resources and applying to similar areas of work? Was the coherence ensured also during the implementation of the Fund?</p>
	<p>The objectives set in the National Programme are mainly coherent with the ones set in other programs funded by EU resources and applying to similar areas of work. There are no large discrepancies in regard to this issue.</p> <p>A general observation on the process of determining the national program is that the Responsible Authority's daily actions are quite closely connected with current strategical questions and yet the national program is perceived by some to be defined in a somewhat traditional manner, meaning that the same departments and officials set the multiannual program year after year, which may lead to a lack of innovation and not enough communication about the funding options. However it should be noted that Finland is a small country with limited availability of the experts.</p> <p>This may also have to do with the fact that the communication about the national process is not that well marketed or brought into attention, and the process could be more transparent and critical. During this evaluation the need for vaster knowledge about the Fund was brought forward, meaning that currently the new beneficiaries do not have significant knowledge about the available funding opportunities. This in turn may signify that beneficiaries who have gained funding previously are more aware of the funding opportunity, and have more advantage in applying for funding. This should be noted even though most of the ISF beneficiaries in Finland are authorities and the biggest beneficiaries have themselves centralized the coordination of external funding to the headquarters. There are nevertheless some actions, related for example to supporting crime victims, where the third sector is involved.</p> <p>The national agenda has been perceived as somewhat ambivalent and now there</p>

	<p>is a new strategy for recognizing forces of change that need to be addressed.</p> <p>There have also been efforts to include different parties into the preparation of the national program, but it was perceived as challenging to get comments or contributions from other actors.</p>
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4.1	<p>Was an assessment of other interventions with similar objectives carried out and taken into account during the programming stage?</p>
	<p>The Responsible Authority does, in cooperation with other Funds an assessment of interventions with similar objectives during the programming stage, when evaluating which efforts to fund.</p> <p>With regard to the AMIF, there is an assessment of similar objectives concerning, for example, anti-radicalisation measures that are implemented in both funds. There is an assessment done of what the division of work is in these actions and where the funds should be applied from. Also a discussion is in place for the current actions taken and what aspects should be taken into account.</p>

4.2	<p>Were coordination mechanisms between the Fund and other interventions with similar objectives established for the implementing period?</p>
	<p>Due to the nature of the ISF actions, the beneficiaries are mainly other authorities. This facilitates the supervision and quality control of the RA, since Finnish authorities have established good cooperation.</p> <p>There are several coordination mechanism in place. The coordination within both the ISF and AMIF funds is at a good level as the AMIF and the ISF are in the same unit in Finland. This means that they work very closely, continuous tracking and meetings are in place if needed, and according to the situation the units take necessary action. A synergy process has been considered within the ISF in order to systematically track possible similarities in actions related to other funding instruments. A similar synergy process is already in place in the AMIF that deals more with similarities in actions funded.</p> <p>The funded actions are coordinated with the EU structural funds, EU external relations instruments, EU justice programme and Horizon 2020. The ISF RA is a member of the steering group of the EU justice programme. The EU funding steering group and Horizon 2020 are under the Ministry of Interior. The ISF fund's monitoring committee supports the RA in the coordination of objectives and actions with other EU funded and national actions. It has been ensured that the ISF-P actions regarding risks and crises are not overlapping with EU humanitarian aid and rescue (ECHO) actions.</p>

	<p>The coordination of actions in third countries is done through the EU Foreign Service. Information on the actions is either delivered to the country in question or through a national or EU representative.</p> <p>The beneficiaries give information about other EU funding received in their applications. The ISF RA and beneficiaries also give information and advises what the program contains and what can be applied for. For example there are certain areas of similarities such as the hate crime aspect that connects to both legal and police actions. In Finland these actions are separated, but in certain Member States they are connected. Therefore in order to share information between the entities there is proactivity in place so that the police is aware of the available funding. The Ministry of Justice also has a task force in place where they discuss this theme on a regular bases.</p>
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4.3	Were the actions implemented through the Fund coherent with and non-contradictory to other interventions with similar objectives?
	Based on our observations, the actions implemented through the fund were coherent and non-contradictory to other interventions with similar objectives.

5	Complementarity
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5	<p>The overall question: Were the objectives set in the national programme and the corresponding implemented actions complementary to those set in the framework of other policies - in particular those pursued by the Member State?</p>
	<p>There are not as many junction points to the other programs in the ISF as there are in the AMIF. The area where there might be similarities or crossing points deal mainly with the justice sector EU programs. Also there may be some similarities within the Horizon2020 research projects, but an operative line of decision has been taken so that the same use cannot receive ISF funding. The nature of the Horizon 2020 project is also very different, as it is focused on research and innovation, whereas the multinational projects and ISF-projects are very concrete and operative in nature.</p>

5.1	Was an assessment of other interventions with complementary objectives carried out and taken into account during the programming stage?
	<p>The assessment of the complementarity was done during the programming stage. This means that when the objectives and actions of the program were defined, they were checked to be aligned with the national strategy and in relation to other funding programs. This was supported for example with a large comment round. The Responsible Authority does also an assessment of interventions with complementary objectives during the programming stage, when evaluating which efforts to fund.</p> <p>With regards to the AMIF, there is an assessment of similar objectives for example with regards to anti-radicalisation measures that are linked to integration measures. There is an assessment done of what the division of actions is and from where the funds should be applied. Also a discussion is in place for the current actions taken and what aspect should be taken into account. Although AMIF is not funding actions aimed against radicalisation but for example related to integration, these may reduce the risk of radicalisation. The actions of the ISF and the AMIF are in that sense complementary, as ISF deals with anti-radicalisation measures.</p>

5.2	Were coordination mechanisms between the Fund and other interventions with similar objectives established to ensure their complementarity for the implementing period?
	<p>In the ISF, the monitoring committee of the Fund acts as the main coordination mechanism. The different actors in the field of operations of the Fund are represented in the committee and they support the RA in ensuring the complementary between the Fund and other interventions with similar objectives.</p> <p>The AMIF and the ISF are the same unit in Finland. This means that continuous tracking and meetings are in place if needed, and, according to the situation, the units take necessary action. Starting a synergy process within the ISF unit has been considered in order to systematically track possible similarities in actions. A similar synergy process is already in place in the AMIF concerning the other funding instruments that deal with similar actions.</p> <p>The beneficiaries give information about other EU funding received in their applications. The ISF and the beneficiaries also advises on the contents of the program and what can be applied for. For example there are certain areas of similarities such as the hate crime aspect that connects to both legal and police actions. In Finland these actions are separate, but in certain Member States they are connected. Therefore in order to share information between the entities there is proactivity in place so that the police is aware of the available funding. The Ministry of Justice also has a task force in place where they discuss this theme on a regular bases.</p>

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5.3	Were mechanisms aimed to prevent overlapping of financial instruments put in place?
	The actions implemented through the fund were aligned with the targets of the fund. There may be some similarities within Horizon2020 research projects, and an operative line of decision has been taken so that the same purpose cannot receive ISF funding. During the evaluation we did not observe any breaches between the ISF and other interventions with similar objectives.

6	EU added value
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6	The overall question: Was any added value brought about by the EU support?
	<p>The EU added value can be difficult to assess, due to several different reasons. Firstly, a large amount of the ISF fund support actions are carried out by authorities and are mandatory or necessary in nature. Therefore several actions carried out by the ISF support would be carried out in one form or another even if the EU Fund support was not received. However, the EU funding is important to these actions by enabling earlier implementation and wider actions.</p> <p>Secondly, actions that are seemingly small or isolated, and might not have value at an EU level, or actions that are mostly mechanical or barely exceed the critical volume or mass, may still lead to further actions at a later time, and therefore be of benefit at the union level.</p> <p>Thirdly, some of the actions will be executed at the end of the Programme and thus cannot be evaluated at this point. These have been scheduled according to plan.</p> <p>The current EU support is of great advantage for the Border Control authorities in regard of the organisation of actions taken. This EU-added value is created for example by using the acquired equipment in EU border surveillance operations. In generally, as Finland has EU external borders, the efficient external border surveillance in Finland creates added value to the whole EU. When the EU's external borders are monitored and information is shared effectively between the Member States the potential security threats can be quickly identified and addressed. Also when the external borders are secured the internal borders can be open, which benefits the whole EU.</p> <p>The current EU support is also of great benefit to the development of large IT systems that are utilized by one or more authorities. The IT systems are mainly</p>

	part of the EU IT-systems and thus facilitate the information exchange between the Member States.
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6.1	What are the main types of added value resulting from the support of the Fund (volume, scope, role, process)?
	<p>The main type of added value resulting from the support of the Fund deals with the ability to do continuous development work and further forms of actions. The EU funding has made it possible to place even more focus on actions that would have been implemented independently of the funding provided. In most of the cases the Fund has also made it possible to start the necessary actions much earlier than without the funding.</p> <p>The EU funding steers the actions of the Member State in a parallel direction and makes these efforts possible. The development of the Member state actions that are based solely on EU directives are considered difficult to carry out. The EU funding has the possibility to effect these actions and provide a stronger steering methodology.</p>

6.2	Would the Member State have carried out the actions required to implement the EU policies in the areas supported by the Fund without its financial support?
	<p>In some level and in some time frame, Finland would have been able to carry out most actions to implement the EU policies in the areas supported by the ISF without its financial support. The EU support has been an important addition to funding, and made further development efforts possible. Also, in many cases, beneficiaries were able to carry out actions much faster than without the EU funding.</p> <p>Some actions are very dependent on EU funding. However, if they are related to a binding international agreement, they would have been implemented at some point and a certain level. The projects which were strongly dependent on EU funding are such as the RUM project, which deals with the execution of the crime victim directive. Without funding for the project, the IT system development could not have been carried out at this stage. Another example is the Russian language training –project which most likely would not have been carried out without financial support at this stage. Also for example the decision to finance the Environment for managing travel document certificates –project was conditional to EU-financing. Some educational actions benefited greatly from EU funding. The prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism in university setting project would not have been carried out without EU funding. Also the development of cyber education for authorities would not have been able to be conducted according to the frame of cyber</p>

	<p>security strategy without EU funding at this stage.</p> <p>Also, the implementation of conventions has eased due to EU funding. The Istanbul convention IV (2015) states that all nations should have a 24/7 telephone line to help victims of violence free of charge. Previously there has not been a helpline service available 24/7 in Finland, but this was established on 1.12.2016 due to EU funding.</p> <p>One aspect is also that several actions funded by the ISF deal with the procurement of equipment (vehicles, IT and CBRNE). They are usually cost heavy and require systematic and strategic planning. The perseverance in equipment procurement is an essential aspect so even if there are changes in the operating environment, these actions cannot be interrupted.</p>
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6.3	<p>What would be the most likely consequences of an interruption of the support provided by the Fund?</p>
	<p>A large number of the ISF funded actions are mandatory by law, such as border control actions, and would be carried out at some level and in some time frame, even if EU funding was not provided. However as the financial resources are tight and for example the surveillance of external borders is increasingly based on technical surveillance, as human resources are reduced, the delays will not be welcome. Also if other funding has to be used to execute critical actions, it is always at the cost of something else.</p> <p>The main consequence is most likely the delay in actions. It is problematic to assess the actual consequences of delays as it depends on how actions would have been prioritised in that case. The interruption of the support would most likely impact the speed of carrying out larger investments, such as IT system development and testing or trainings, which are not so crucial for safety. Nevertheless, the delays in these hinder the realisation of the objectives of EU.</p>

6.4	<p>To which extent have actions supported by the Fund resulted in a benefit at the Union level?</p>
	<p>Achieving results acts as a criteria for choosing the actions that receive funding. If the actions of a project have international dimension or reach, they are seen as creating great benefit. Here are some examples of benefits observed:</p> <p>SO1</p> <p>One good example of a successful concept development which could be used widely in the EU is the concept of outsourcing visa service centres (submitting service for visa applications) is. It has proved to be very effective and can be</p>

easily transferred to other EU countries.

The liaison officer system is as a second example of action that supports not only Finland but the whole EU fighting against illegal entry to EU area. The advantage comes from the detection of illegal immigration and the prevention of crime already before entering the EU area.

A third example is the development project of Finland's national visa information system (SUVI) including functionalities required by the Visa Code Plus and thus benefiting the whole EU. A common Schengen visa information system has several advantages to the whole EU.

SO2

Also actions with SO2 are resulting in benefits at the EU level. For example an environment for managing travel document certificates benefits all countries as Finnish travel certificates are now available via the ICAO PKD-service.

A second example are the upgraded NCC premises which improves information exchange between the Member States. Information exchange between the EU Member States is an important part of the EU security.

In general, all equipment acquired for border surveillance improves the security of the EU external borders and thus it can be said that the final beneficiary of these actions is the whole EU.

SO 5

At a Union level, the benefits of the funded actions relate to the increased operational capacities of the Member State to combat crime on the Internet and cyber related crimes, which in turn signifies more cost-effective operations in investigation and a higher risk of getting caught of these crimes. Since cyber related crimes are not limited to national borders, the advancements will have a benefit at the Union level in the form of more effective investigations and actions, thus possible minimizing the effects of crime in the future. The Police in particular collaborate with Member State authorities, Europol and Interpol on a day to day basis in developing best practices and in information sharing.

An example of this is the BITCOIN-JIT project, which develops effective prevention methods for the area of virtual currencies, crime, and money laundering and criminal benefit through international cooperation and wide cooperation of authorities. This action is different from the smaller scaled day to day actions of the Police forces, and therefore the EU funded support is of importance.

There is international cooperation between the different authorities in FINSIU (Finnish Special Intervention Units), and information is shared between different countries and the readiness for cooperative efforts is improved for situations where the country borders are crossed, for example during terrorist attacks.

Preventing crime by developing and promoting information sharing between authorities through the use of a centralized, unique IT system solution (KEJO-system). International cooperation is done with authorities that have shown

	<p>interest in the Finnish models and technical solutions, and information sharing is done on the expert level between different countries</p> <p>Certain actions have listed specified benefits at the Union level. Special intervention units' optronical devices utilize the performance capabilities gained from the project in Frontex- coordinated border control operations outside of the EU external border.</p> <p>The measuring results gained from the condensed phase of the GC-FTIR for the fight against drug crime will be shared with the EMCDDA (European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and drug Addiction) through the information system EDND and may therefore be of assistance for EU Custom's laboratories in identifying substances by giving comparison spectres and analytics.</p>
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6.5	What was the added value of the operating support?
	<p>The added value of operating support meant that the beneficiaries were able to apply for funding for operational costs, which had not been previously possible. This option meant that beneficiaries with high cost operations were able to fund part of their mandatory operations with EU funding. The additional funding made it possible to conduct and place focus on these efforts instead of having to find budgeting elsewhere, where some other functions might have been forced to be cut back in their operations. Taking into account these benefits it should be considered whether operating support could be included in ISF-P and AMIF in the future as well.</p> <p>In total, there were four actions funded within the operational support, three of which are still ongoing at the time of this evaluation.</p> <p>The absence of internal borders in the Schengen area requires a sound management of external borders where each country has to control the external border on behalf of the other Schengen States. Consequently, no Member State is able to cope on its own with irregular immigration. The added value of operating support deals with maintaining and securing the existing national visa system and joint actions in the VIS-central system, maintenance and operating costs of offshore patrol vessels, organising the EU wide SIS II system for national 24/7 use, securing the 24/7 operations of the national coordination centre NCC for producing a situational picture of the current national state for the EUROSUR-system. The actions are based on the EU article N:o 1052/2013, on the establishment of the EUROSUR border control system.</p>

7	Sustainability
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7	<p>The overall question: Are the positive effects of the projects supported by the Fund likely to last when its support will be over?</p>
	<p>The sustainability is assessed by the RA both at the programming and implementation stages. Also it can be noted that beneficiaries of the ISF are mainly authorities, which gives them certain responsibility and also interest to secure the sustainability of the positive effects in their own area of work, for example by arranging funding for maintenance.</p> <p>The actual sustainability of the positive effects can be seen only once the projects have concluded. For example, if a project is not successful, it may not have any lasting positive effects but may still give valuable information about whether or not certain actions are possible to be carried out in the Member State, by a certain authority, or in the specific operational environment. This information in itself is of value, even though the effects may not be positive or lasting in nature.</p> <p>One example of information value is the project of acquiring a light E-boat, which was a success. One important part of the project was to evaluate the boat concept. The concept was generally evaluated as good but there were also some important findings which are valuable in the further development work of this boat-series. The second example is the project of development of the situation picture system. The second phase of the project failed as it was not possible to transfer data from the cloud services to the other TUVE environment. This was unexpected but gave valuable information for further development.</p>

7.1	<p>What were the main measures adopted by the Member State to ensure the sustainability of the results of the projects implemented with support of the Fund (both at programming and implementation stage)?</p>
	<p>The sustainability and effectiveness of project actions is a part of the selection criteria when choosing actions for funding in the programming stage. If actions deal with development of actions or operations, actions that have higher sustainability are preferred compared to actions with little or no sustainability.</p> <p>Some actions also have predetermined life spans, such as acquiring technical equipment that have a predetermined economical and technical life span. The equipment itself has little or no sustainability after that point, but this aspect is taken into consideration during the programming stage. These types of actions are mainly mandatory in nature, so they are to be executed even though sustainability is low after a certain amount of time. Their life span can also be extended for example in case of patrol vehicles by circulating vehicles from one station to another (within external borders). This helps to even out the kilometers of the vehicles.</p> <p>Some projects funded by ISF, like acquiring spare parts and upgrading or updating the systems are in themselves securing the continuity of results. For</p>

	<p>example the project of upgrading the surveillance capabilities of helicopters was needed for securing the continuity of external border surveillance from aircrafts through their life span.</p> <p>One aspect to consider is also the actual result of acquiring this equipment or the benefit the equipment produces. For example camera sensors are needed for the camera systems of patrol vessels. The camera system improves the capability to detect and identify targets in maritime areas, which improves border surveillance and security.</p>
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7.2	<p>Were mechanisms put in place to ensure a sustainability check at programming and implementation stage?</p>
	<p>Based on our interview, at the programming stage the sustainability was one criteria when planning which actions will be included in the programme. This had also essential aspects in law drafting. It is required by the law that the results are sustainable unless obviously unnecessary.</p> <p>At the implementation stage, sustainability is part of the assessment when granting funding, and some kind of a sustainability plan from the beneficiary is expected. This directs the beneficiaries already in the beginning of the call for proposal process to take sustainability into consideration.</p> <p>Sustainability has also been addressed by using steering groups for each of the project that consist of different stakeholders relevant to the project scope. This works also as an information sharing platform for project achievements and makes sure that the relevant partners are engaged and committed to continuing with the project outputs and results after the project has been completed.</p> <p>One observation, however, was made when reviewing the project completion reports. The current completion reporting template does not include any section on where the project implementer would assess how the activities regarding sustainability have succeeded. That section could also include planned steps for example a six month period on how the sustainability of the results could be strengthened after the project has been completed.</p>

7.3	<p>To what extent are the outcomes/benefits of the actions sustained by the Fund expected to continue thereafter?</p>
	<p>When acquiring new equipment and technologies, compatibility and information sharing has played an important role. Also the equipment is acquired due to operational demand and not for the projects. In the procurement of technical equipment, the lifespan of the equipment usually amounts to several years, meaning that the sustained actions will be in place for its entire technical</p>

lifespan. For example the lifespan for the acquired equipment by the Finnish Border Guard is relatively long, vehicles about 8 years and for IT systems can be even longer.

Nevertheless, there is also an example of a rather short lifespan, the updates done to the SUVI. Based on our interview, the system is coming to the end of its lifespan and there is a plan put out to tender for a new national visa system. However, updating the system was a mandatory action for assuring a working visa system until then, and this can still take years. Also in all bigger updates of the system are aiming to the modular structure and as applicable these can be used also in the new system.

The lifespan of the equipment/system depends strongly also on the quality of the equipment and on the functions and arrangements of maintenance. Based on our observations this has been well taken into account already in the planning of the acquisitions and in the bidding process. For example when the travel document certificate management system was acquired, maintenance for five years was included in the contract. However, it is to be noted that the maintenance fee, based on our interview, is not included in the project.

The outsourcing project of the visa service centres for submitting visa applications is a good example of sustainability being taken into account from 3 aspects:

1. Knowledge transfer from the external consultants to the own personnel has enabled all current and new visa service centres projects to be managed by an internal project manager.
2. There is clear intention to set up more visa service centres.
3. The concept of the visa service centres is self-financing and thus the operations are expected to continue as long as there is demand for the service.

It should be also noted that projects related to training have a much wider impact than the actual course held during the reporting period. For example the training material for Russian courses is web-based and thus a much wider audience can take advantage of the training material. The course is also available much longer than just during the project. Certain actions can also be multiplied if the results are converted to English, for example the development of Cyber competence 2020 courses and Cybercrime education, and Identification in Dialogue where tools on how to start a conversation about difficult subjects are illustrated through animations.

The National Police Board has secured the sustained actions funded by the Fund by committing vacancies to the established cybercrime centre and by making the methodologies and models developed in IT- and other project actions part of the day to day Police work through, for example, internal regulations. Officials are also provided training so that the knowledge gained can be transferred to the personnel.

Within the actions dealing with CBRNE education and equipment, sustainability is ensured through the technical lifespan of equipment (5-10 years depending on

	<p>equipment) procured, and through the training offered to personnel. When assessing the vulnerability of the critical infrastructure and the operational capability of authorities, the developed schooling model makes it possible to modify the possible scenarios and to create new scenarios at a later time.</p> <p>Other actions, such as the results of the RAVET, dealing with anti-radicalisation in universities, can be taken into use immediately, and integrated into the everyday security work at universities.</p>
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7.4	<p>What measures were adopted to ensure the continuity of the activities carried out thanks to the operating support?</p>
	<p>The continuity of the activities carried out, thanks to the operating support, dealt mostly with the technical implementation of software. The actions are a part of the day to day activities, which ensures the continuity of activities.</p> <p>Since activities carried out thanks to operating support often dealt with mandatory tasks that are required to be carried out continuously, the actions will therefore continue after the operating support has ended.</p>

8	Simplification and reduction of administrative burden
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8	<p>The overall question: Were the management procedures of the Fund simplified and the administrative burden reduced for its beneficiaries?</p>
	<p>During the implementation period the EU Commission has highlighted the aspect of the reduced administrative burden, which in turn has effected the actions of the Member State Responsible Authority (RA). The issue is still, however, somewhat burdensome due to different aspects. The reduction of the administrative burden for beneficiaries, alongside the Commission's requirements of quality tracking and eliminating fraud or irregularities, signifies that the RA is under pressure from both angles.</p> <p>As it is now, it is laborious for the Ministry to conduct the tracking needed, and the measures needed from the beneficiaries are also laborious. The structure of the programme could be more flexible.</p>

8.1	<p>Did the innovative procedures introduced by the Fund (simplified cost option, multiannual programming, national eligibility rules, more comprehensive national programmes allowing for flexibility, operating support and Special Transit Scheme for Lithuania) lead to simplification for the beneficiaries of the Fund?</p>
	<p>The cost models are seen as a good option and have provided some relief to the administrative burden. The flat rate financing is widely in use. The utilization of the flat rate financing for indirect costs regarding the funded projects has facilitated the beneficiaries, since travel costs do not need to be tracked in the bookkeeping. This has simplified the reporting and auditing on behalf of the RA as well.</p> <p>Only one project has taken the lump sum in use. The reasons for this are that the maximum lump sum funding has previously been confined to EUR 10 000, which is very low in comparison to the projects being funded under the ISF actions, which may in fact be up to the scale of EUR 1 000 000 or more. The upcoming raise of the lump sum maximum amounting to EUR 100 000 will probably impact the use of this model in the future and make it more attractive for beneficiaries, as it is closer to the funding needed for these measures. It must be noted, however, that this option is seen as quite risky by the beneficiaries since the model does not require the tracking of costs during project implementation, and funding may be lost in case the targets are not reached in the project. This entails a significant risk for the beneficiary, which therefore also effects the willingness to utilize this option.</p> <p>The funding application process has been made electronic, which has also facilitated the work of the RA since all relevant documents are stored in one place and the communication with beneficiaries is simplified. However, the evaluation brought out that the electronic system was not that technically flexible and the user interface is not user friendly which meant that beneficiaries had to reserve a significant amount of time just to process the information through the system perceived as slow. They also stated that the storing function did not serve the beneficiary as after sending the application, the beneficiary was not able return to the sent documents and thus all documents related to the application had to be printed out. Same goes with invoices related to the project which would be useful to store there but this is not possible in practice. Also taking into account that there are more audits in place, some beneficiaries, based on our interviews, find the new system even more laborious than the previous system with paper applications. The further development of the system would be essential.</p> <p>It was also pointed out by the beneficiaries that as reporting periods of the fund do not match with other financial reporting, it causes extra work. The available indicators are often found overwhelming as quite often the available indicators do not match with the gained benefits. Even if it is relatively hard to find suitable indicators, reassessing them might be worth it.</p> <p>The structural change of the programme from the annual programmes to the multiannual programme has allowed better and more rational planning and implementation of the actions as the projects can be longer. This simplifies administration. However, the mismatches with reporting frequencies between the</p>

	<p>projects and the programme are still causing extra work.</p>
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	<p>Operative support was a welcome reform.</p>
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SECTION V: PROJECT EXAMPLES

Description of three 'success stories', among all the projects funded

Example 1

One of the projects considered successes in this evaluation was the **Model for Universities to Tackle Radicalisation and Violent Extremism RAVET**. The project was implemented by the Laurea University of Applied Sciences. The project focused on the Specific Objective 6 (Risks and safety). The project started in February 2016 and was completed in February 2017.

The planning of the project started at the Laurea University of Applied Sciences. The project deals with the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism (RVE) in university setting by developing a model for safety work in universities.

There have been few RVE projects in Finland and none done in a university setting. The underlying motivation for conducting this project is that there is a strong need for a functioning RVE model since studies have shown that the site for attacks is most commonly one of the following: prison, school or Internet. Extremist thinking is more prevalent in young people and young adults and a large portion of them spend a lot of time in school settings. Therefore RVE could be detected and prevented where the potential perpetrators are. RVE can be detected in attitudes, such as anger and intolerance, and the attitudes create the base for actions.

The personnel in universities need more information on recognizing radical students and their actions. Laurea has 7 campuses in the Uusimaa region, 7000 students and 500 employees. Actions taken in the project include a benchmarking study to learn about Britain's practices in RVE prevention in universities, the use of different physical spaces, IT-infrastructure and the role of education on preventing RVE. Also a written report on university quality control systems and ethical values and teaching was made, and an e-education packet for university personnel was prepared.

In general the project managed to implement the planned activities well. It has managed to reach over 100 students, which gained knowledge of RVE and were activated through university courses. There were also three students that completed their bachelor thesis based on the RVE project.

In terms of sustainability, the results of the project can be taken into use immediately, and integrated into everyday security work at universities. The results can also be included in future training sequences and updated if necessary at a low cost. The disbursement of e-education for the whole personnel can contribute to the sustainability of the project. Laurea applied for further funding for RVE projects from the H2020-program, but did not receive further funding.

Challenges reported by the project had to do with the scale of the project, that was set at an ambitious range before knowledge about the actual funding (30 000 euro) was made clear. There were also some challenges in integrating the project with the curriculum, which was established long before the RVE project was cleared for funding. Also the sensitiveness of

Example 1

the subject matter became a challenge, as the experts interviewed did not want their names published in materials. However, the project did manage to reach a fairly wide audience since over 100 students were involved and gained knowledge on RVE.

Concerning the lessons learnt from the project the project developer experienced that in the beginning the project plan should have been more focused on just a few tasks, with regards to the scope of planning. It was also noted that also the difficulty of sensitiveness should be taken into account when dealing with issues concerning RVE.

As a summary the project has had a good effect with implementing the planned activities, although the project did not meet all its tasks due to sensitiveness issues and over-ambitious planning.

Example 2

The second project which was considered as successes in this evaluation was the **Outsourcing of the reception of visa applications in the missions**. The project was implemented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The project focused on the Specific Objective 1 (Visa). The project started in July 2014 and was completed in December 2016.

The project was set to respond to the challenge of growing numbers of visa applications in certain locations. Finland has good experience of visa service centre outsourcing. Finland has improved consular coverage by establishing a total of **29 outsourced visa service centres**. The target was 19 visa service centres. The number includes both hub and satellite service centres. Service centres are located in Thailand (1), China (15), India (6), Turkey (2), Egypt (1), Tunis (1) and Great Britain (3). The hub service centres are located in missions.

The visa service centres are serving visa applicants by receiving and submitting the visa applications. The service centers have 4V-functionalities which allow transferring biometric identifiers from service centers to the national visa system (SUVI). Funding was found important for meeting the challenge of growing numbers of visa applications in these locations. It can be said that the visa service centres have a remarkable role in the sense that financial resources are limited and not expected to grow and at the same time the demand of the visa services in certain locations has increased.

The result of the project was outsourced visa service centres. According to the beneficiary this can be seen by the customer as a shortened queuing time and visa application processing time. The aim of the project was to receive 100 % cost correlation which according to the final report has been received and in certain location even exceed. The beneficiary is not paying for the service provider but the partner is receiving its income from the service fees. Also the quality of applications has been improved. All service centers have the same harmonized practices and according to the beneficiary the customers have been very satisfied with the services.

The project was a success due to a harmonized global concept which was created in previous projects. The plan was systematically followed, the lessons learned were collected from the previous projects and also used in this project. The project plan was followed and the clear

Example 2

objectives were set.

The project was well managed. An external consultant was managing all the individual outsourcing projects. This was to assure the needed competence of project management.

In terms of sustainability the results of the project are expected to last. The concept is clever as it is self-financing and the operations do not produce any costs to the Member State after establishing the centres. The project also included training and the outsourcing partner works in cooperation with other mission's entry services. There is a plan for continuing to outsource the reception of visa applications. As the knowledge transfer from the external consultant has been done, new outsourcing projects can be done with internal resources.

There were some challenges with the timetable as the timetable set by the application team did not match with project plan schedule set by the project team. Thus the lesson to be learned is to put more effort on internal communication.

Example 3

The third example that can be considered successful is the project of **developing environment for managing the travel document certificates**. The project focused on the Specific Objective 2 (Borders). The project was implemented by the National Police Board. The project began in January 2016 and was concluded in December 2016.

The aim of the project was to produce a management system which qualifies international standards and information security. The main benefit is increased security. The new system enables to upload/ manage certificates from other countries and download/distribute Finnish certificates by using the ICAO-PKD service. The ICAO Public Key Directory (PKD) is a central repository for exchanging the information required to authenticate ePassports. The ICAO PKD ensures that information can be exchanged reliably, in a timely manner and on an open-ended, indefinite basis.

Earlier both management and distribution needed to be done manually, bilaterally and for example following the validity of the certificates was laborious. Also the volume of information being exchanged would result in a highly complex and ineffective system that would be susceptible to errors. Based on our interviews, the new systems means that checking the certificates is now more systematic, partly automatic, more reliable (up-to-date), there is more information available and the information is available faster. It is also reported that the new system is user-friendly and efficient which reduces working time and mistakes. The client application was installed to each chip reader workstation (about 550). The project contributes to the objective of smooth crossing of the external borders in conformity.

The project was success due the several reasons. The project had a professional project management and project team. The team had enough substance and technical knowledge as well as experience in project management and procurement. The requirements and options available were investigated carefully beforehand which enabled a quality bidding process.

Example 3

The project was well managed and achieved its targets. The project stayed in budget but did not manage to stay in the set timetable of the original project plan, but it did stay in the project period timetable.

The results are expected to be sustainable and lasting. The maintenance contract is in place for the next 5 years. There is also already a plan in place for further development by acquiring other certificate systems for controlling fingerprint readings, which will further increase the security as well as the smooth crossing of external borders.

The challenges met were related mainly to the National Security Network (TUVE) environment (TUVE audit, fitting the plug-in software to the TUVE environment and its requirements etc.) and the organisation changes which affected the installations. However, due to the professional project team these challenges did not cause remarkable delays as the project was able to stay in the set project period.

Example

One of the projects that was considered as a possible “failure” in this evaluation was the project implemented by the National Police Board, **KYBOL – national cybercrime centre**. The project falls under SO 5 Crime and began in January 2015 and ended in December 2016.

The aim of the project was to create a cybercrime centre. The aim was also to create an organisation of cybercrime prevention and stronger national cooperation between different actors. The goal was that the Police have efficient prerequisites to prevent, discover and detect crimes directed towards the cyber operating environment. The aim was that the Police be able to prevent cyber threats according to the national cyber safety strategy, and the results will reveal and prevent the threats to the Finnish society more effectively.

The cybercrime centre was established on 15.4.2015 and has been allocated 45 employees by the National Police Board. However, it became apparent quite soon after the project was started that the tasks planned for the KYBOL were somewhat similar to the tasks for another National Police Board project named **Timantti - System architecture of dataset handling in police operations**. When the similarities were detected, it was decided that these tasks would be moved under Timantti. The Timantti project began in January 2017 and is ongoing until February 2019.

In general the project managed to implement the planned activities well, with the exception of the implementation of SeDaCop, the national technical information infrastructure and mapping of the national investigative state. These functions were moved under Timantti.

In terms of sustainability the project approach is that the tasks of the project are integrated into Timantti project. The challenges reported by the project had to do with the similarity of tasks within both KYBOL and Timantti that were not able to be carried out within the KYBOL project.

Concerning the lessons learnt from the project the project developer experienced that in the beginning the project plan should have been more focused on projects requiring similar tasks. However, the similarities were known already when planning the projects so the implementer was able to take corrective actions at a rapid rate. This resulted in the funds of the KYBOL being moved to Timantti in order to carry out the necessary tasks.

As a summary the project has had a good effect with implementing the planned activities, although the project did not meet all the planned tasks and targets due to the overlapping activities.

SECTION VI: METHODOLOGY

This evaluation had a primary focus in the alignment of the funded project portfolio compared to the targets set by the European Commission. The purpose was to make sure that the Fund is progressing in the right direction. Also the facts that at the time of the evaluation only a some of the projects had been completed with results indicated that the value of this evaluation would be rather in the alignment of activities rather than measuring outcomes against set targets. Nevertheless, also indicators were evaluated to provide understanding of the current progress towards targets.

The data used for this evaluation has been collected from many sources, by combining qualitative and quantitative data collection methods. In order to support this evaluation process and, especially to make sure that all the data and information is relevant to the reporting templates of the Commission, the RA had established a tool to collect information regarding project outputs from the project developers. The new web-based tool for data collection is a good improvement compared to the data collection methods during the previous SOLID funding period. During the SOLID funding period the data was mainly collected out of written reports with no possibility to convert the data into the excel format.

The new reporting format had been to some extent a challenge for the project beneficiaries as it had some problems with functioning at least in the early phase of the project. The RA also had to correct some of the data manually as it had been incorrectly entered into the system. The data was also reviewed by the evaluator by comparing the numbers in the tool with the ones presented in the project reporting.

The reporting provided by all the projects funded within this funding period was collected and analysed in this evaluation. As the reporting of every individual project was reviewed, the evaluator evaluated the nature of the activities and results to meet with the definitions stated in the templates. Some of the projects funded under the National Programme did not match directly with the areas defined in the EC declaration and the reporting template. In those cases the evaluator analysed the content of the projects and made sure that all relevant information was included under the fields in the reporting template. This was done to ensure that all the contributions done by the projects were included in the evaluation.

The qualitative data gathered from the project reports was supported by interviews conducted with the personnel of the Ministry of the Interior of Finland. Interviews were also conducted with the project developers, especially to evaluate the sustainability of the results and the reasons behind the successes and failures. Publications on the specific issues was also used as supporting documentation to review the current state of this governance sector.

The actual evaluation of the results and possible impacts was conducted by triangulating the information provided by the project implementers, government officials, and official government reports. Also the data collected by the European Commission into the SFC system was compared to the indicators reported by the projects. This was mainly done to evaluate whether the indicators are similar and a possible impact of the project can possibly be seen through the data collected by other agencies. However, this was not possible to do in its full extent, do the fact that the data was received at the last stage.

SECTION VII: MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Main conclusions

Conclusion 1

The electronic system and reporting.

The electronic system for reporting was considered non-user friendly. The electronic system for reporting was considered welcome by the RA, since it made the handling of reports more effective. However, the beneficiaries reported that the system was technically not flexible and the user interface was not user friendly. The inconvenience experienced dealt with the fact that the system was experienced as very slow, it did not allow jumping and returning between pages and working off-line was not possible. This made filling in the forms somewhat challenging and the beneficiaries had to reserve a significant amount of time just to process the information through the system. It was also stated out that the storing function did not serve the beneficiary.

Within SO 3 (operational support), it was considered difficult to fill in the project reports as the actions in the SO 3 differ from other actions in the sense that the actions are ongoing activities. The reporting sheet did not support this type of ongoing actions, which was considered a challenge.

Conclusion 2

Uncertain and unsuitable indicators.

The final indicators were not received from the Commission until autumn of 2017. This means that it is hard to deliver outputs which align with these targets and to assess the effectiveness against these indicators. The unavailable or delayed indicators also complicated the evaluation work, as the premises are that indicator information should be used as a source for the evaluation.

Also in generally in some projects the set project indicators do not measure the actual gained benefits.

Conclusion 3

Log frame. The RA has not utilised a log frame approach as part of the planning process for the National plan. The result of this is that it is hard to clearly align objectives in the National plan with the areas presented in the European Commission regulation and this evaluation report template. Using a log frame during the planning phase creates clarity on

Conclusion 3

the impact path between individual activities and long term impacts that the fund aims to have an impact on. This also works as a risk mitigating measure to decrease the risk of choosing wrong activities, target groups, or approaches on how to implement those activities.

Conclusion 4

Assessment of the sustainability in the completion reporting. The current completion reporting template for beneficiaries does not include any section for assessing how well the activities of the project regarding sustainability have succeeded. This section could also include the planned steps for example for a six month period on how the sustainability of the results could be strengthened after the project has been completed.

Conclusion 5

The operating support was found very welcome. Based on our observation there are three main aspects why the operating support is an important addition.

It enabled funding for mandatory ongoing activities, which was not possible previously. The maintenance and updates of equipment and IT systems as well as having enough human resources are important also in a tight economic situation, as the maintenance expenses are usually relatively high. The additional funding made it possible to conduct and place focus on these efforts instead of having to find budgeting elsewhere, and some other function might have had to cut back on their operations instead. The operative support contributes to maintaining and securing the existing important systems and equipment and thus promotes sustainability of the activities based on EU regulation.

Secondly, based on our interview, there has been cases where the funding has been drawn back due to different interpretations of new developments. It has not always been easy to draw the line between a new development and updating the current one. The operating support answers this problem as well.

Thirdly, the operating support is an effective tool to promote the usage of the uniform practices and systems in the EU. In practice it enables for instance opening international system interfaces more effectively than through national development actions. Operative support is currently available only for ISF-B.

Recommendations

Recommendations 1

Reporting.

Improvements to the electronic system for reporting. We recommend to take actions to improve the technical system qualities in order to make the system more user friendly.

We recommend to consider tailoring the reporting for SO 3 (Operational support) to meet better the operational requirements for these types of ongoing actions.

Recommendations 2

Final indicators available at the beginning of programming phase. In order to ensure that the projects deliver outputs that are aligned with the targets of the fund, the indicators should be confirmed already as the project developers prepare their project proposals.

We recommend that in the following program period, the EU Commission gives a clear list of indicators to be collected so that both the national RA and beneficiaries can better adjust to these indicators in the implementing stage. This also makes the follow-up of actions taken easier, and the results indicated give a more accurate description of the actual situation.

Recommendations 3

Log frame approach. We recommend to use a log frame approach in aligning the project activities and indicators. The use of a log frame also creates clarity on which activities are intended to have an impact on which targets.

Recommendations 4

Assessment on sustainability in completion reporting. The completion reporting template for beneficiaries could include a section on where the beneficiary would assess how well the activities of the project regarding sustainability have succeeded in the project. The section could also include planned steps for example for a six month period on how the sustainability of the results could be strengthened after the project has been completed.

Recommendations 5

We recommend to consider whether the **operating support** can be expanded also to the ISF-P as it supports maintaining and securing the existing important systems and equipment, it reduces misinterpretations which may lead to claims for recovery and promotes usage of uniform practices and systems in EU.

SECTION VIII: MID-TERM REVIEW

Provide an assessment of the mid-term review carried out in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 514/2014. If relevant, summarize the main changes having an impact on your activities in the policy areas covered by the Fund, and how your National Programme was/will be adjusted.

Main changes in the operating environment

Finland has seen an unprecedented influx of asylum seekers. In 2015 Finland received nearly 33 000 asylum seekers - 10 times the level of the previous years. Since 2015 the number of applications has decreased. The pressure of illegal immigration to the EU remains. Thousands have had their asylum applications rejected. The amount of illegal residents in Finland has increased. Opinions in social debate have polarised. Increased number of persons are linked with terrorism. The terrorism threat level has been raised to "elevated".

Tension and military activity in areas close to Finland have increased. The situation at the eastern border of Finland is less predictable due to changes in Russian foreign policy and economic troubles. The risk of severe border security incidents has increased. In the new security environment, the authorities have to be prepared for a range of threats and risks affecting people and infrastructure, including consequences of a terrorist attack on soft targets and CBRNE threats.

Changes to the programme:

Changes in the operational environment impose new performance and preparedness requirements.

Finland received 4,9m euros of top-up funding to the ISF-B as a result of the Mid-term Review. In order to respond to the changed environment Finland proposes to use approx. half of the funding to the development of IT-systems, one fourth to surveillance and detection capacity and one fourth to reaction capacity. National preparative measures for entry-exit implementation shall be made. Next generation automated border control technology such as gates and kiosks will be purchased and national border control applications, including automated number plate recording, will be developed. Premises for ETIAS units are needed. Interoperability of border control systems must be addressed, too. Border surveillance and detection capacity shall be strengthened by new sensor technology such as movable surveillance sensors and drones. Patrol units shall be equipped with new capacities for use of force and protection and mobility of patrols shall be improved. These measures will improve reaction speed and capacity for protection of soft targets at the eastern border.

Finland put more focus on radicalisation in its implementation of the National Programme already in 2016. After the terrorist attack in Turku in August 2017 an urgent need to equip police patrols with better protection equipment was identified.

Under the ISF-P Finland proposes to develop sophisticated technology such as data mining and analysis, facial and gait recognition and IT-developments deriving from EU-obligations

(SIS, EURODAC, ECRIS, interoperability). In the risk and crises section of the financing instrument the needs are linked CBRNE threats. More funding is needed for the development of CBRNE training environments in order to allow for cross sectional trainings and international trainings with other EU member states.

The surveillance of rapidly increasing e-commerce activities calls for better surveillance technology and new systems and equipment that automatically detect high-risk parcels and postal deliveries such as weapons, explosives, narcotics and drugs while making it possible to target physical checks more efficiently. Equipping postal delivery and parcel handling systems with chemical detection technology (e.g. explosives) is also important.

SECTION IX: COMMON RESULT AND IMPACT INDICATORS

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1 - Indicators by specific objectives

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	Baseline value	Source of data	2017
SO1	R	SO1R1	Number of Schengen Evaluation missions in the area of visa carried out with support of the Internal Security Fund ("Fund")	Number		Commission Unit HOME C.2 Border Management and Schengen	
SO1	R	SO1R2	Number of consular cooperation activities developed with the help of the Fund	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO1 C1)	0.00
SO1	R	SO1R3	Number of staff trained in aspects related to the common visa policy with the help of the Fund	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO1 C2.1)	87.00
SO1	R	SO1R3	Number of training courses in aspects related to the common visa policy with the help of the Fund	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO1 C2.2)	2.00
SO1	R	SO1R4	Number of consulates developed or upgraded with the help of the Fund out of the total number of consulates	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO1 C4.1)	0.00
SO1	R	SO1R4	Percentage of consulates developed or upgraded with the help of the Fund out of the total number of consulates	Percentage	0.00	AIR (indicator SO1 C4.2)	0.00
SO1	R	SO1R5	(a) Number of Schengen Evaluation recommendations in the area of visa addressed with the support of the Fund	Number		Member States	
SO1	R	SO1R5	(b) Total number of Schengen Evaluation recommendations issued	Number		Member States	
SO1	R	SO1R5	Number of Schengen Evaluation recommendations in the area of visa	Ratio		/	

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	Baseline value	Source of data	2017
			addressed with the support of the Fund, as compared to the total number of recommendations issued				
SO1	R	SO1R6	Number of persons using fraudulent travel documents detected at consulates supported by the Fund: (a) Number of persons with fraudulent documents applying for a Schengen visa	Number		Member States	66.00
SO1	R	SO1R6	(b) Total number of persons applying for a Schengen visa	Number		Member States	567,065.00
SO1	R	SO1R6	(c) Percentage of persons with fraudulent documents applying for a Schengen visa	Ratio		/	0.00
SO1	I	SO1I1	Number of visa applicants having to apply for a Schengen visa outside of their country of residence	Number		Member States	10,691.00
SO1	I	SO1I2	Number of visa required countries in the world where the number of Member States present or represented has increased	Number		Commission Unit HOME B.2 Visa Policy Policy / VIS system	
SO2	R	SO2R1	Number of staff trained in borders management related aspects with the help of the Fund	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO2 C1.1)	65.00
SO2	R	SO2R1	Number of training courses in border management related aspects with the help of the Fund	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO2 C1.2)	3.00
SO2	R	SO2R2	Number of border crossings of the external borders through ABC gates supported from the Fund	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO2 C3.1)	0.00

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	Baseline value	Source of data	2017
SO2	R	SO2R2	Total number of border crossings	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO2 C3.2)	10,230,000.00
SO2	R	SO2R3	Number of Schengen Evaluation missions in the area of borders carried out with the support of the Fund	Number		Commission Unit HOME B.2 Visa Policy Policy / VIS system	
SO2	R	SO2R4	(a) Number of Schengen Evaluation recommendations in the area of borders addressed with the support of the Fund	Number		Member States	
SO2	R	SO2R4	(b) Total number of Schengen Evaluation recommendations in the area of borders issued	Number		Member States	
SO2	R	SO2R4	Number of Schengen Evaluation recommendations in the area of borders addressed with the support of the Fund, as compared to the total number of recommendations issued	Ratio		/	
SO2	R	SO2R5	(a) Number of equipment items used during Frontex Coordinated Operations which were purchased with support of the Fund	Number		Frontex	0.00
SO2	R	SO2R5	(b) Total number of equipment items used for Frontex Coordinated Operations	Number		Frontex	2.00
SO2	R	SO2R5	Number of equipment items used during Frontex Coordinated Operations which were purchased with support of the Fund as compared to the total number of equipment items used for Frontex Coordinated	Ratio		/	0.00

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	Baseline value	Source of data	2017
			Operations				
SO2	I	SO2I1	Number of national border surveillance infrastructure established/further developed in the framework of EUROSUR:	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO2 C4)	0.00
SO2	I	SO2I1	(a) National coordination centres	Number		AIR (indicator SO2 C4.a)	0.00
SO2	I	SO2I1	(b) Regional coordination centres	Number		AIR (indicator SO2 C4.b)	0.00
SO2	I	SO2I1	(c) Local coordination centres	Number		AIR (indicator SO2 C4.c)	0.00
SO2	I	SO2I1	(d) Other types of coordination centres	Number		AIR (indicator SO2 C4.d)	0.00
SO2	I	SO2I2	Number of incidents reported by the Member State to the European Situational Picture	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO2 C5)	1,047.00
SO2	I	SO2I2	(a) Illegal immigration, including on incidents relating to a risk to the lives of migrants	Number		AIR (indicator SO2 C5.a)	970.00
SO2	I	SO2I2	(b) Cross-border crime	Number		AIR (indicator SO2 C5.b)	77.00
SO2	I	SO2I2	(c) Crisis situations	Number		AIR (indicator SO2 C5.c)	0.00
SO2	I	SO2I3	Number of irregular border crossings detected at the EU external borders: between the border crossing points	Number	4.00	Frontex	27.00
SO2	I	SO2I3	Number of irregular border crossings detected at the EU external borders:	Number	0.00	Frontex	870.00

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	Baseline value	Source of data	2017
			at the border crossing points				
SO2	I	SO2I4	Number of searches in Schengen Information System (SIS) II	Number		EU-Lisa and SIS II annual report	0.00
SO2	I	SO2I5	Number of persons using fraudulent travel documents detected at the border crossing points	Number	49.00	Frontex	0.00
SO5	R	SO5R1	Number of joint investigation teams (JITs) and European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) operation projects supported by the Fund, including the participating Member States and authorities	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO5 C1)	0.00
SO5	R	SO5R2	Number of law enforcement officials trained on cross-border related topics with the help of the Fund	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO5 C2.1)	1,261.00
SO5	R	SO5R2	Duration of the training (carried out) on cross-border related topics with the help of the fund	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO5 C2.2)	3,000.00
SO5	R	SO5R3	Results of actions supported by the Fund leading to the disruption of organised crime groups: 1. seizures of criminal commodities: Counterfeited goods	Amount in EUR		Member States	0.00
SO5	R	SO5R3	Contraband goods	Amount in EUR		Member States	0.00
SO5	R	SO5R3	Stolen goods	Amount in EUR		Member States	0.00
SO5	R	SO5R3	Firearms	Amount in EUR		Member States	0.00

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	Baseline value	Source of data	2017
SO5	R	SO5R3	Environmental crimes	Amount in EUR		Member States	0.00
SO5	R	SO5R3	Cannabis (in number of seizures)	Number		Member States	725.00
SO5	R	SO5R3	Heroin (in number of seizures)	Number		Member States	12.00
SO5	R	SO5R3	Cocaine (in number of seizures)	Number		Member States	118.00
SO5	R	SO5R3	Amphetamine - methamphetamine (in number of seizures)	Number		Member States	896.00
SO5	R	SO5R3	Ecstasy (in number of seizures)	Number		Member States	257.00
SO5	R	SO5R3	New psychoactive substances (in number of seizures)	Number		Member States	14.00
SO5	R	SO5R3	LSD (in doses)	Number		Member States	296.00
SO5	R	SO5R3	2. seizures of cash (by value);	Amount in EUR		Member States	0.00
SO5	R	SO5R3	3. seizures of other assets (by estimated value);	Amount in EUR		Member States	0.00
SO5	R	SO5R3	4. takedowns of web domains (number);	Number		Member States	0.00
SO5	R	SO5R3	5. victims identified (for certain crime types);	Number		Member States	0.00
SO5	R	SO5R3	6. persons arrested	Number		Member States	0.00
SO5	I	SO5I1	Number/value of frozen, seized and confiscated criminal assets as a result of actions within the scope of Regulation (EU) 513/2014: 1. number of freezing orders executed;	Number		Member States	0.00

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	Baseline value	Source of data	2017
SO5	I	SO5I1	2. number of confiscation orders executed;	Number		Member States	0.00
SO5	I	SO5I1	3. estimated value of property frozen, at least of property frozen with a view to possible subsequent confiscation at the time of freezing;	Amount in EUR		Member States	0.00
SO5	I	SO5I1	4. estimated value of property recovered at the time of confiscation	Amount in EUR		Member States	0.00
SO5	I	SO5I1	5. number of cases where the confiscation order issued on basis of the Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA has not been executed	Number		Member States	0.00
SO5	I	SO5I2	Number of police-recorded offences, suspects, prosecutions and convictions resulting from actions falling within the scope of Regulation (EU) 513/2014: 1. Police-recorded offences	Number	109,510.00	Eurostat (crim_off_cat)	0.00
SO5	I	SO5I2	2. Persons brought into formal contact with the police and/or criminal justice system	Number	276,361.00	Eurostat (crim_just_ctz)	0.00
SO5	I	SO5I2	3. Prosecuted persons	Number	185,901.00	Eurostat (crim_just_ctz)	0.00
SO5	I	SO5I2	4. Convicted persons	Number	182,679.00	Eurostat (crim_just_ctz)	0.00
SO5	I	SO5I3	Quantity of drugs seizure within the scope of the Fund on organised crime: 1. Cannabis seizures	Number		EMCDDA - European Drugs Report - Early Warning	0.00

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	Baseline value	Source of data	2017
						System (EWS) and European Database on New Drugs (EDND)	
SO5	I	SO513	2. Heroin seizures	Number		EMCDDA	0.00
SO5	I	SO513	3. Cocaine seizures	Number		EMCDDA	0.00
SO5	I	SO513	4. Amphetamine and methamphetamine seizures	Number		EMCDDA	0.00
SO5	I	SO513	5. Ecstasy seizures	Number		EMCDDA	0.00
SO5	I	SO513	6. New psychoactive substances notified	Number		EMCDDA	0.00
SO5	I	SO513	7. LSD (doses)	Number	3,970.00	EMCDDA	0.00
SO5	I	SO514	Number of protected or assisted crime victims: 1. Number of victims recorded by the law enforcement agencies	Number		Member States	0.00
SO5	I	SO514	2. Number of referrals by police to victim support services	Number		Member States	0.00
SO5	I	SO514	3. Number of victims that request and receive support	Number		Member States	0.00
SO5	I	SO514	4. Number of victims that request and do not receive support	Number		Member States	0.00
SO5	I	SO515	Volume of exchange of information in the Prüm framework: 1. total number of DNA matches per year	Number of 'hits'		EC HOME D.1 (Statistical compilation)	197.00

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	Baseline value	Source of data	2017
SO5	I	SO515	2. total number of fingerprint matches per year	Number of 'hits'		EC HOME D.1 (Statistical compilation)	13.00
SO5	I	SO515	3. total number of vehicle registration data matches per year	Number of 'hits'		EC HOME D.1 (Statistical compilation)	0.00
SO5	I	SO516	Volume of exchange of information in the Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA) framework: 1. SIENA cases initiated per year by Member States, Europol and third parties	Number	2,968.00	Europol	233.00
SO5	I	SO516	2. SIENA messages exchanged per year by Member States, Europol and third parties	Number	149,880.00	Europol	7.00
SO5	I	SO517	Volume of sharing of data via the Europol Information System (EIS): 1. number of persons and objects inserted in the EIS by Member States per year	Number	8,660.00	Europol	0.00
SO5	I	SO517	2. number of person and objects inserted in the EIS by Member States per year (suspects, convicts)	Number	3,642.00	Europol	0.00
SO5	I	SO517	3. number of EIS searches performed by Member States per year	Number	23,098.00	Europol	713,241.00
SO6	R	SO6R1	Number and tools put in place and/or further upgraded with the help of the Instrument to facilitate the protection of critical infrastructure by Member States in all sectors of the economy	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO6 C1)	0.00

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	Baseline value	Source of data	2017
SO6	R	SO6R2	Number of expert meetings, workshops, seminars, conferences, publications, websites and online consultations organised with the help of the Instrument.	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO6 C3)	8.00
SO6	I	SO6I1	Volume of terrorist attacks: (a) number of failed and foiled terrorist attacks	Number		Europol - EU Terrorism situation and trend report	0.00
SO6	I	SO6I1	(b) number of completed terrorist attacks	Number		Europol - EU Terrorism situation and trend report	1.00
SO6	I	SO6I1	(c) number of casualties resulting from terrorist attacks	Number		Europol - EU Terrorism situation and trend report	2.00

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	2016	2015	2014
SO1	R	SO1R1	Number of Schengen Evaluation missions in the area of visa carried out with support of the Internal Security Fund ("Fund")	Number			
SO1	R	SO1R2	Number of consular cooperation activities developed with the help of the Fund	Number	0.00		
SO1	R	SO1R3	Number of staff trained in aspects related to the common visa policy with the help of the Fund	Number	0.00	75.00	
SO1	R	SO1R3	Number of training courses in aspects related to the common visa	Number	0.00	11.00	

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	2016	2015	2014
			policy with the help of the Fund				
SO1	R	SO1R4	Number of consulates developed or upgraded with the help of the Fund out of the total number of consulates	Number		6.00	
SO1	R	SO1R4	Percentage of consulates developed or upgraded with the help of the Fund out of the total number of consulates	Percentage		8.00	
SO1	R	SO1R5	(a) Number of Schengen Evaluation recommendations in the area of visa addressed with the support of the Fund	Number			
SO1	R	SO1R5	(b) Total number of Schengen Evaluation recommendations issued	Number			
SO1	R	SO1R5	Number of Schengen Evaluation recommendations in the area of visa addressed with the support of the Fund, as compared to the total number of recommendations issued	Ratio			
SO1	R	SO1R6	Number of persons using fraudulent travel documents detected at consulates supported by the Fund: (a) Number of persons with fraudulent documents applying for a Schengen visa	Number	100.00	105.00	154.00
SO1	R	SO1R6	(b) Total number of persons applying for a Schengen visa	Number	59,028.00	955,051.00	1,143,458.00
SO1	R	SO1R6	(c) Percentage of persons with fraudulent documents applying for	Ratio	0.00	0.00	0.00

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	2016	2015	2014
			a Schengen visa				
SO1	I	SO1I1	Number of visa applicants having to apply for a Schengen visa outside of their country of residence	Number	13,504.00	13,294.00	10,962.00
SO1	I	SO1I2	Number of visa required countries in the world where the number of Member States present or represented has increased	Number			
SO2	R	SO2R1	Number of staff trained in borders management related aspects with the help of the Fund	Number	13.00	73.00	
SO2	R	SO2R1	Number of training courses in border management related aspects with the help of the Fund	Number	1.00	5.00	
SO2	R	SO2R2	Number of border crossings of the external borders through ABC gates supported from the Fund	Number	0.00		
SO2	R	SO2R2	Total number of border crossings	Number	0.00		
SO2	R	SO2R3	Number of Schengen Evaluation missions in the area of borders carried out with the support of the Fund	Number	0.00	0.00	0.00
SO2	R	SO2R4	(a) Number of Schengen Evaluation recommendations in the area of borders addressed with the support of the Fund	Number			
SO2	R	SO2R4	(b) Total number of Schengen Evaluation recommendations in the area of borders issued	Number			

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	2016	2015	2014
SO2	R	SO2R4	Number of Schengen Evaluation recommendations in the area of borders addressed with the support of the Fund, as compared to the total number of recommendations issued	Ratio			
SO2	R	SO2R5	(a) Number of equipment items used during Frontex Coordinated Operations which were purchased with support of the Fund	Number			
SO2	R	SO2R5	(b) Total number of equipment items used for Frontex Coordinated Operations	Number			
SO2	R	SO2R5	Number of equipment items used during Frontex Coordinated Operations which were purchased with support of the Fund as compared to the total number of equipment items used for Frontex Coordinated Operations	Ratio			
SO2	I	SO2I1	Number of national border surveillance infrastructure established/further developed in the framework of EUROSUR:	Number	0.00		
SO2	I	SO2I1	(a) National coordination centres	Number	0.00		
SO2	I	SO2I1	(b) Regional coordination centres	Number	1.00		
SO2	I	SO2I1	(c) Local coordination centres	Number	0.00		
SO2	I	SO2I1	(d) Other types of coordination centres	Number	0.00		

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	2016	2015	2014
SO2	I	SO2I2	Number of incidents reported by the Member State to the European Situational Picture	Number			
SO2	I	SO2I2	(a) Illegal immigration, including on incidents relating to a risk to the lives of migrants	Number			
SO2	I	SO2I2	(b) Cross-border crime	Number			
SO2	I	SO2I2	(c) Crisis situations	Number			
SO2	I	SO2I3	Number of irregular border crossings detected at the EU external borders: between the border crossing points	Number	8.00	9.00	13.00
SO2	I	SO2I3	Number of irregular border crossings detected at the EU external borders: at the border crossing points	Number	1,021.00	1,181.00	1,125.00
SO2	I	SO2I4	Number of searches in Schengen Information System (SIS) II	Number	48,177,902.00	43,632,971.00	38,184,846.00
SO2	I	SO2I5	Number of persons using fraudulent travel documents detected at the border crossing points	Number	37.00	39.00	37.00
SO5	R	SO5R1	Number of joint investigation teams (JITs) and European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) operation projects supported by the Fund, including the participating Member States and authorities	Number			
SO5	R	SO5R2	Number of law enforcement	Number			

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	2016	2015	2014
			officials trained on cross-border related topics with the help of the Fund				
SO5	R	SO5R2	Duration of the training (carried out) on cross-border related topics with the help of the fund	Number			
SO5	R	SO5R3	Results of actions supported by the Fund leading to the disruption of organised crime groups: 1. seizures of criminal commodities: Counterfeited goods	Amount in EUR			
SO5	R	SO5R3	Contraband goods	Amount in EUR			
SO5	R	SO5R3	Stolen goods	Amount in EUR			
SO5	R	SO5R3	Firearms	Amount in EUR			
SO5	R	SO5R3	Environmental crimes	Amount in EUR			
SO5	R	SO5R3	Cannabis (in number of seizures)	Number	1,431.00	1,472.00	1,470.00
SO5	R	SO5R3	Heroin (in number of seizures)	Number	18.00	16.00	13.00
SO5	R	SO5R3	Cocaine (in number of seizures)	Number	169.00	107.00	60.00
SO5	R	SO5R3	Amphetamine - methamphetamine (in number of seizures)	Number	1,557.00	1,291.00	1,062.00
SO5	R	SO5R3	Ecstasy (in number of seizures)	Number	395.00	352.00	313.00
SO5	R	SO5R3	New psychoactive substances (in number of seizures)	Number	15.00	30.00	88.00

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	2016	2015	2014
SO5	R	SO5R3	LSD (in doses)	Number	626.00	1,207.00	343.00
SO5	R	SO5R3	2. seizures of cash (by value);	Amount in EUR	0.00	0.00	0.00
SO5	R	SO5R3	3. seizures of other assets (by estimated value);	Amount in EUR	0.00	0.00	0.00
SO5	R	SO5R3	4. takedowns of web domains (number);	Number	0.00	0.00	0.00
SO5	R	SO5R3	5. victims identified (for certain crime types);	Number	0.00	0.00	0.00
SO5	R	SO5R3	6. persons arrested	Number	0.00	0.00	0.00
SO5	I	SO5I1	Number/value of frozen, seized and confiscated criminal assets as a result of actions within the scope of Regulation (EU) 513/2014: 1. number of freezing orders executed;	Number	0.00	0.00	0.00
SO5	I	SO5I1	2. number of confiscation orders executed;	Number	0.00	0.00	0.00
SO5	I	SO5I1	3. estimated value of property frozen, at least of property frozen with a view to possible subsequent confiscation at the time of freezing;	Amount in EUR	0.00	0.00	0.00
SO5	I	SO5I1	4. estimated value of property recovered at the time of confiscation	Amount in EUR	0.00	0.00	0.00
SO5	I	SO5I1	5. number of cases where the confiscation order issued on basis of the Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA has not been	Number	0.00	0.00	0.00

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	2016	2015	2014
			executed				
SO5	I	SO5I2	Number of police-recorded offences, suspects, prosecutions and convictions resulting from actions falling within the scope of Regulation (EU) 513/2014: 1. Police-recorded offences	Number	21,807.00	105,688.00	11,125.00
SO5	I	SO5I2	2. Persons brought into formal contact with the police and/or criminal justice system	Number	54,582.00	262,267.00	208,449.00
SO5	I	SO5I2	3. Prosecuted persons	Number	38,451.00	182,805.00	139,419.00
SO5	I	SO5I2	4. Convicted persons	Number	37,853.00	179,894.00	137,003.00
SO5	I	SO5I3	Quantity of drugs seizure within the scope of the Fund on organised crime: 1. Cannabis seizures	Number	56.00	291.00	289.00
SO5	I	SO5I3	2. Heroin seizures	Number	0.00	0.00	0.00
SO5	I	SO5I3	3. Cocaine seizures	Number	2.00	8.00	5.00
SO5	I	SO5I3	4. Amphetamine and methamphetamine seizures	Number	63.00	300.00	236.00
SO5	I	SO5I3	5. Ecstasy seizures	Number	4,929.00	46,168.00	104,263.00
SO5	I	SO5I3	6. New psychoactive substances notified	Number			
SO5	I	SO5I3	7. LSD (doses)	Number	821.00	3,455.00	1,275.00
SO5	I	SO5I4	Number of protected or assisted	Number	0.00	0.00	0.00

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	2016	2015	2014
			crime victims: 1. Number of victims recorded by the law enforcement agencies				
SO5	I	SO5I4	2. Number of referrals by police to victim support services	Number	0.00	0.00	0.00
SO5	I	SO5I4	3. Number of victims that request and receive support	Number	0.00	0.00	0.00
SO5	I	SO5I4	4. Number of victims that request and do not receive support	Number	0.00	0.00	0.00
SO5	I	SO5I5	Volume of exchange of information in the Prüm framework: 1. total number of DNA matches per year	Number of 'hits'	221.00	200.00	31.00
SO5	I	SO5I5	2. total number of fingerprint matches per year	Number of 'hits'	35.00	78.00	6.00
SO5	I	SO5I5	3. total number of vehicle registration data matches per year	Number of 'hits'	0.00	0.00	0.00
SO5	I	SO5I6	Volume of exchange of information in the Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA) framework: 1. SIENA cases initiated per year by Member States, Europol and third parties	Number	7,347.00	5,467.00	2,484.00
SO5	I	SO5I6	2. SIENA messages exchanged per year by Member States, Europol and third parties	Number	261,870.00	213,837.00	135,967.00
SO5	I	SO5I7	Volume of sharing of data via the	Number	38,973.00	22,081.00	9,582.00

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	2016	2015	2014
			Europol Information System (EIS): 1. number of persons and objects inserted in the EIS by Member States per year				
SO5	I	SO5I7	2. number of person and objects inserted in the EIS by Member States per year (suspects, convicts)	Number	10,981.00	6,927.00	3,347.00
SO5	I	SO5I7	3. number of EIS searches performed by Member States per year	Number	552,903.00	83,146.00	24,227.00
SO6	R	SO6R1	Number and tools put in place and/or further upgraded with the help of the Instrument to facilitate the protection of critical infrastructure by Member States in all sectors of the economy	Number			
SO6	R	SO6R2	Number of expert meetings, workshops, seminars, conferences, publications, websites and online consultations organised with the help of the Instrument.	Number			
SO6	I	SO6I1	Volume of terrorist attacks: (a) number of failed and foiled terrorist attacks	Number	0.00	0.00	0.00
SO6	I	SO6I1	(b) number of completed terrorist attacks	Number			
SO6	I	SO6I1	(c) number of casualties resulting from terrorist attacks	Number	0.00	0.00	0.00

2 - Indicators on efficiency, added value and sustainability, as foreseen in Regulation (EU) No 514/2014

Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	Baseline value	Source of data	2017
H1	Number of Full Time Equivalent in the Responsible Authority, the Delegated Authority and the Audit Authority working on the implementation of the Fund and paid by the technical assistance or national budgets as compared to:	Number		Member States	6.00
H1	(a) the number of projects implemented	Number		Member States	9.00
H1	(b) the amount of the funds claimed for the financial year	Amount in EUR		Member States	10,758,621.00
H2	(a) Technical assistance plus the administrative (indirect) cost	Amount in EUR		Member States	616,848.00
H2	(b) Amount of funds claimed for the financial year	Amount in EUR		Member States	10,758,621.00
H2	Technical assistance plus the administrative (indirect) cost of projects as compared to the amount of funds claimed for the financial year	Ratio		/	0.06
H3	Amount of the annual accounts submitted by the Member State compared to the	Amount in EUR		SFC2014	5,293,336.00
H3	Total amount of funds allocated to the national programme.	Amount in EUR		SFC2014	55,156,295.00
H3	Absorption rate of the Fund	Ratio		/	0.10

Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	Baseline value	Source of data	2017
H4	(a) Number of equipment in use 2 years after their acquisition (> than EUR 10.000)	Number		Member States	210.00
H4	(b) Number of equipment acquired under the Fund (> than EUR 10.000)	Number		Member States	57.00
H4	Number of equipment in use 2 years after their acquisition / number of equipment acquired under the Fund (> than EUR 10.000)	Ratio		/	3.68
H5	(a) Maintenance cost of acquired equipment under the Fund	Amount in EUR		Member States	
H5	(b) Total EU contribution	Amount in EUR		Member States	10,758,621.00
H5	Share of the maintenance cost of acquired equipment under the Fund in the total Union contribution to actions co-financed by the Fund	Ratio		/	0.00

Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	2016	2015	2014
H1	Number of Full Time Equivalent in the Responsible Authority, the Delegated Authority and the Audit Authority working on the implementation of the Fund and paid by the technical assistance or national budgets as compared to:	Number	6.00	6.00	3.00
H1	(a) the number of projects implemented	Number	53.00	0.00	0.00
H1	(b) the amount of the funds claimed	Amount in EUR	11,155,839.00	12,244,647.00	0.00

Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	2016	2015	2014
	for the financial year				
H2	(a) Technical assistance plus the administrative (indirect) cost	Amount in EUR	842,169.00	204,263.00	0.00
H2	(b) Amount of funds claimed for the financial year	Amount in EUR	11,155,839.00	12,244,647.00	0.00
H2	Technical assistance plus the administrative (indirect) cost of projects as compared to the amount of funds claimed for the financial year	Ratio	0.08	0.02	0.00
H3	Amount of the annual accounts submitted by the Member State compared to the	Amount in EUR			
H3	Total amount of funds allocated to the national programme.	Amount in EUR			
H3	Absorption rate of the Fund	Ratio			
H4	(a) Number of equipment in use 2 years after their acquisition (> than EUR 10.000)	Number	113.00	150.00	194.00
H4	(b) Number of equipment acquired under the Fund (> than EUR 10.000)	Number	10.00	0.00	0.00
H4	Number of equipment in use 2 years after their acquisition / number of equipment acquired under the Fund (> than EUR 10.000)	Ratio	11.30	0.00	0.00
H5	(a) Maintenance cost of acquired equipment under the Fund	Amount in EUR			

Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	2016	2015	2014
H5	(b) Total EU contribution	Amount in EUR	11,155,839.00	12,244,647.00	0.00
H5	Share of the maintenance cost of acquired equipment under the Fund in the total Union contribution to actions co-financed by the Fund	Ratio	0.00	0.00	0.00

Table 1: Progress in financial implementation, by specific objectives (in Euro)**Financial report ISF-Borders**

National objective / Specific Action	A Total paid	B Total paid	Total paid (A+B/SO) programmed (%)
SO1.NO1 National capacity	491,179.12	266,012.37	26.14%
SO1.NO2 Union acquis	73,485.93	25,845.27	58.29%
SO1.NO3 Consular cooperation	277,500.00	454,400.84	214.76%
TOTAL NO SO1	842,165.05	746,258.48	46.61%
SO1.SA1 Consular cooperation	0.00	0.00	
TOTAL SO1	842,165.05	746,258.48	46.61%
SO2.NO1 EUROSUR	732,462.91	1,332,666.73	19.07%
SO2.NO2 Information exchange	0.00	0.00	0.00%
SO2.NO3 Common Union standards	25,827.37	0.00	1.57%
SO2.NO4 Union acquis	30,329.43	31,700.82	18.90%
SO2.NO5 Future challenges	0.00	0.00	
SO2.NO6 National capacity	435,294.19	154,254.69	17.97%
TOTAL NO SO2	1,223,913.90	1,518,622.24	16.72%
SO2.SA2 FRONTEX equipment	347,821.62	0.00	96.62%
TOTAL SO2	1,571,735.52	1,518,622.24	18.43%
SO3.NO1 Operating support for VISA	566,370.75	280,661.09	33.33%
SO3.NO2 Operating support for borders	2,808,905.94	669,440.67	28.43%
TOTAL NO SO3	3,375,276.69	950,101.76	
TOTAL SO3	3,375,276.69	950,101.76	29.28%
Technical Assistance	333,457.44		

TOTAL	6,122,634.70	3,214,982.48	25.04%
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Financial report ISF-Police

National objective / Specific Action	A Total paid	B Total paid	Total paid (A+B/SO) programmed (%)
SO5.NO1 C - prevention and combating	957,141.16	1,186,190.99	31.98%
SO5.NO2 C - exchange of information	0.00	76,843.44	4.36%
SO5.NO3 C - training	181,938.47	30,563.06	18.07%
SO5.NO4 C - victim support	45,160.97	328,418.77	21.18%
SO5.NO5 C - threat and risk assessment	0.00	0.00	0.00%
TOTAL NO SO5	1,184,240.60	1,622,016.26	
TOTAL SO5	1,184,240.60	1,622,016.26	23.87%
SO6.NO1 R - prevention and combating	0.00	25,776.09	87.68%
SO6.NO2 R - exchange of information	0.00	0.00	0.00%
SO6.NO3 R - training	13,137.42	0.00	7.45%
SO6.NO4 R - victim support	0.00	14,985.34	25.49%
SO6.NO5 R - infrastructure	0.00	7,005.49	0.48%
SO6.NO6 R - early warning and crisis	0.00	0.00	0.00%
SO6.NO7 R - threat and risk assessment	0.00	0.00	0.00%
TOTAL NO SO6	13,137.42	47,766.92	
TOTAL SO6	13,137.42	47,766.92	2.07%
Technical Assistance	333,457.45		
TOTAL	1,530,835.47	1,669,783.18	20.41%

Table 2: Number of projects and EU contribution to finished and open projects, by specific objectives (in Euro)

	Number of projects and EU contribution 01/01/2014-15/10/2016			
	Total Nr of finished projects	Total EU contribution to finished projects	Total Nr of open projects	Total EU contribution to open projects
SO1 - Support a common visa policy	0	0.00	6	842,165.05
SO2 - Borders	2	184,086.92	15	1,387,648.60
SO3 - Operating support	0	0.00	0	0.00
SO4 - Technical assistance - visa and borders	0	0.00	0	0.00
SO5 - Preventing and combating crime	1	9,966.96	21	1,174,273.64
SO6 - Risks and crisis	0	0.00	5	13,137.42
SO7 - Technical assistance - police	0	0.00	0	0.00
SO8 - Special case: Operating support for the special transit scheme (Lithuania)	0	0.00	0	0.00
Total 1	3	194,053.88	47	3,417,224.71

	Number of projects and EU contribution 16/10/2016-30/06/2017			
	Total Nr of finished projects	Total EU contribution to finished projects	Total Nr of open projects	Total EU contribution to open projects
SO1 - Support a common visa policy	2	704,303.21	5	41,955.27
SO2 - Borders	1	70,308.00	17	1,448,314.24
SO3 - Operating support	0	0.00	4	950,101.76
SO4 - Technical assistance - visa and borders	0	0.00	0	0.00
SO5 - Preventing and	1	1,284.98	25	1,620,731.28

	Number of projects and EU contribution 16/10/2016-30/06/2017			
	Total Nr of finished projects	Total EU contribution to finished projects	Total Nr of open projects	Total EU contribution to open projects
combating crime				
SO6 - Risks and crisis	0	0.00	7	47,766.92
SO7 - Technical assistance - police	0	0.00	0	0.00
SO8 - Special case: Operating support for the special transit scheme (Lithuania)	0	0.00	0	0.00
Total 2	4	775,896.19	58	4,108,869.47
Total 1+2	7	969,950.07	105	7,526,094.18

Table 3: Number of projects and EU contribution, by types of beneficiaries and by specific objectives (in Euro)

		Project beneficiaries 01/01/2014-15/10/2016			
		SO1: Visa policy	SO2: Borders	SO5: Crime	SO6: Risks & crisis
State/federal authorities	Nr of projects	6	17	20	1
State/federal authorities	EU contribution	842,165.05	1,571,735.52	1,149,046.59	0.00
Local public bodies	Nr of projects	0	0	0	1
Local public bodies	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Non-governmental organisations	Nr of projects	0	0	2	0
Non-governmental organisations	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	35,194.01	0.00
International public organisations	Nr of projects	0	0	0	0
International public organisations	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
National Red Cross	Nr of projects	0	0	0	0
National Red Cross	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
International Committee of the Red Cross	Nr of projects	0	0	0	0
International Committee of the Red Cross	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies	Nr of projects	0	0	0	0
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Private and public law companies	Nr of projects	0	0	0	2
Private and public law companies	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	13,137.42
Education/research organisations	Nr of projects	0	0	0	1
Education/research organisations	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

		Project beneficiaries 16/10/2016-30/06/2017			
		SO1: Visa policy	SO2: Borders	SO5: Crime	SO6: Risks & crisis
State/federal authorities	Nr of projects	7	18	24	2
State/federal authorities	EU contribution	746,258.48	1,518,622.24	1,554,047.60	0.00
Local public bodies	Nr of projects	0	0	0	1
Local public bodies	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	7,005.49
Non-governmental organisations	Nr of projects	0	0	2	0
Non-governmental organisations	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	67,968.66	0.00
International public organisations	Nr of projects	0	0	0	0
International public organisations	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
National Red Cross	Nr of projects	0	0	0	0
National Red Cross	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
International Committee of the Red Cross	Nr of projects	0	0	0	0
International Committee of the Red Cross	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies	Nr of projects	0	0	0	0
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Private and public law companies	Nr of projects	0	0	0	2
Private and public law companies	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	14,985.34
Education/research organisations	Nr of projects	0	0	0	2
Education/research organisations	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	25,776.09

Documents

Document title	Document type	Document date	Local reference	Commission reference	Files	Sent date	Sent By
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